Op-Ed Contributor By Indra Adhikari
Simultaneously with debates of the political parties for their share in the interim government and interim parliament, disarmaments of the rebellion forces and keeping them in cantonment, the independent experts and general Nepalese people have begun their debate to imagine a newer Nepal.
Peace and prosperity were the priority of all Nepalese for years. Their yen for peace was colossally expressed during the April uprising that forced royalty's surrender before the power of the people, losing most of the privileges and prerogatives.
Peace, prosperity and equality with justifiable share of representation of all sections of the people in the state mechanism are some of the vital ingredients necessary for a newer Nepal.
Social and cultural inequalities prevalent in Nepalese society are the greatest challenges lying before the top leaders at this critical phase. Empowerment of women, indigenous communities, backward class and oppressed groups is the must. These communities have repeatedly raised their concerns of being ruled by minorities. While indigenous communities occupy over 45 percent of the Nepal's total population, the Brahim community, regarded as the upper caste in Hindu social hierarchy, who are less than 20 percent of the total population, have overshadowed in the political and economic spheres for centuries.
The indigenous communities have less than 15 percent representation in the present legislature and less than 25 percent in the bureaucracy. While Dalits, who are regarded as untouchables and lie at the bottom of the Hindu hierarchy, composite over 16 percent of the total population but have less then 2 percent access to national politics and governance. In the present cabinet, one person represents Dalits.
Increasing women's participation is another challenge. The reinstated House of Representatives declared 33 percent reservation for women in every aspect of state machinery, but political parties have yet to adhere to their commitment to give that share to the women. While still this extent of inclusion has already become headache for the parties, campaigns have already begun for 50 percent share of women in all aspects. Government while amending the Public Service Act said there would be compulsory 33 percent women involvement in public service. Satirically, only some 2.5 percent women have access at the policymaking level and there is only one female member in the present cabinet.
In the multi-ethnic Nepalese society, social, political and cultural inclusion are the major demands of the lower class people. As a result of that, people from hills and terai, who remained excluded from mainstream social and political life, incessantly supported the populist agenda of the Maoist rebels of giving ethnic autonomy once they capture state power.
In newer Nepal, the citizens imagine to exploit the immense potential of the natural resources. Potentials of hydropower, forest, petroleum and mineral resources have never been caught here. Political interferences and interests of the donor communities, moreover, influence taking decisions in these issues.
Devolution of power to local government and limiting power of the central government is another populist agenda that Maoists carry, since local governments were never empowered in the political history of Nepal despite the commitments of the rulers to handover their power to the people. This is undermining the sovereign power of the people.
In general, massive transformation in social, cultural, economic, political and psychological thoughts and correctly translating these thoughts into action is needed to bring the imagination of a peaceful and prosperous Nepal into reality.
Veteran law expert, who had acted as the law minister during the interim period in 1990, Nilamber Acharya traces out his imagination of newer Nepal as a republic, freed from any kind of feudalism, end of prevailing inequalities, pluralism and sovereign and powerful Nepalese people in a real sense.
Obviously, there is need of transformation by thought and action in family, society, parties and every social institution existing. In totality there is need of transformation of the whole of state, to ensure that people have the ultimate power to determine the type of political system they prefer to see here. More than a decade long practice of democracy has rightly proved that people want neither a family rule nor one party rule that curtails all their rights and liberties of citizens.
In the words of Finance Minister Dr Ram Sharan Mahat, new Nepal will be liberal democratic, pluralistic with a competitive political system, respect for the rule of law and recognition of the fundamental liberties of every person and citizen in the country as guaranteed by the international legal instruments.
In political parties, internal democratisation is another issue. Parties like Nepali Congress, the oldest of Nepal's democratic history, is still run through a family monopoly, the Koiralas, comparatively like Gandhis in Indian Congress. In the newer force like Maoists, securing position for kin and kith have already begun: chairman Prachanda's wife is the party's advisor and the wife of Dr Babu Ram Bhattarai, the second in command of the party, has been promoted to taking charge of foreign affairs. Recent reports have revealed that most of the leaders in this party, at varying length, prefer their near and dear to occupy responsible position in the party.
The other important aspect that is lagging behind while talking about newer Nepal is 'economic agenda'. For centuries, political upheaval has overshadowed the economic agendas in Nepal. In other words, political issues are sidelining economic agendas. Indeed, economic prosperity must get priority in the list of national agenda Nepalese would imagine for a better and prosperous Nepal. As Nepal is already a member of the World Trade Organisation, it needs reconstruction of the industrial sector so as to bring out products that can compete in the international market, at the same time making it cheaper.
Rigorous discussions on issues like restructuring of the state, accountability, transparent justice, interim constitution, development and rebuilding of the state, reconstruction and rehabilitation, economic revitalisation, peaceful landing of the decade long armed conflict and effective management of the arms and armed forces are required before Nepal enters into a newer phase, to make a new history.
(The article is based on the two-day discussion of experts on 'Naya Nepalko Kalpana' (imagination of New Nepal) organised by Actionaid and Social Science Baha in Kathmandu on September 26 and 27).
Indra Adhikari writes on politics, economy and Bhutanese refugees. Associated with Nepalnews and South Asian Media Solidarity Network. A life Member of the International Nepali Literary Society in Washington DC, he can be reached at journo.indra@gmail.com
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Tuesday, September 2, 2008
Does Khasan deserve recognition?
By DR BIPIN ADHIKARI The Kathmandu Post, August 28, 2008
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=158585
Nepal has been declared a federal state by the Interim Constitution. Although this does not establish ethnicity as the fundamental principle of the federal system of government that Nepal is going to adopt, there is a strong possibility that ethnicity will be taken as a major criterion in the formulation of the Nepali scheme of federalism. The opinion being floated from different established corners in the country does not give any better indication.
The issue of federalism in several developing countries has often been one for polemic rather than reasoned analysis. This is what is happening in Nepal as well. The lack of congruence between past and present in Nepal—as well as rivalry between competing contemporary federal visions and neighborhood interests—are likely to be brought into play during the conceptualization and implementation of federalism by the Constituent Assembly. It is yet to be seen whether this empowers the people who deserve empowerment, or gives way to those quarters that should not have any voice in Nepal's political process.
A key problem in this regard is the lack of seriousness on the part of the politicians and party-sponsored activists as to what they want out of federalism. So far there is complete absence of mechanisms for dealing with a multitude of conflicting federal visions competing for the same areas. Except the three political districts in the Kathmandu valley, the nation as a whole has no clue as to what is federalism; and if this is what they want as a gift from the so-called 'New Nepal.' On top of this, even if public opinion should crystallize around one particular vision, the current establishment and its loyal opposition do not have strong willingness to prevent others mounting new challenges against it. The danger is that situations like these could create further chaos and chronic administrative instability.
The issue here is the initial Maoist proposal for federalizing Nepal by creating eight states—Khasan, Tharuwan, Magart, Tamuwan, Tamang, Newa, Kirat and Madhesh—which got a further twist when the CPN-Maoist unveiled their election manifesto in early March 2008. This manifesto further proposed to restructure the unitary state into 11 autonomous federal states and two other sub-states within them keeping in mind what they described as the country's "ethnic composition, geographical contiguity, linguistic base and economic viability."
The Maoist manifesto proposed a three-tier state structure — centre, autonomous federal states and local bodies — with specific rights and responsibility among them, but essentially clinging to their strong ethnic territoriality. They have proposed Seti-Mahakali and Bheri-Karnali federal states based on their geographical appropriateness while the rest — Magarat, Tharuwan, Tamuwan, Newa:, Tamsaling, Kirat, Limbuwan, Kochila and Madhes — have been based on ethnicity. Within the Madhes autonomous state, three sub-states — Mithila, Bhojpura and Awadh — have also been proposed on linguistic basis. The Maoists have also reiterated that every autonomous state will have the right to self-determination.
In this scheme of federalism, the only ethnic territory that has not been given its proper name is Khasan. The party has not explained so far why the state of Khasan has been dropped from their original scheme, and why Seti-Mahakali and Bheri-Karnali federal states have been created in its place giving new name to this territory. The identity of Khasan (the abode of Khas people) is no less historical and real than the rest of the other Nepali communities. They are indigenous to the land; and are the principal inhabitant of their region from time immemorial. If ethnic identity is to be stimulated as a political criterion, then there is no reason why the Khas community—which is one of the major ethnic groups of the country—should be knocked down this way from Nepal's political map.
It is not necessary to refer to the written history of Nepal, and their general role in the nation building. If one is to go by Mahabharata epic—something written before the three thousand years before the birth of Jesus —note that Khasas (including Kirants) have fought war even with Krishna, Karna, Yudhistira and many rulers of the South Asian plains to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of their land.
For a Khas, whether one is a so-called Bahun or a 'sanojat,' the whole of Nepal is his or her home, and there is no ethnic loyalty to any particular piece of land inside the country. They don't say this is ours and that is yours. This is how they have lived in this land since antiquity. They live everywhere; they have equal dedication and concerns for the whole country. They do not want to see the country divided into ethnic line.
Additionally, for Khasas, Nepal is too heterogeneous for ethnic federalism to work. While devolution of power to the territories which require this for empowerment and economic development is fine and must be pursued with urgency, federalising the country along the ethnic criteria is definitely a torturous move, which might weaken this land and all Nepalis commitment for it. This does not mean that they do not have an ethnic territory; and do not mind losing it.
This author has always emphasized that Nepal needs devolution of power to the territories—ethnic or geographical—in an objective basis. Federalism is not necessarily the major issue here. Devolution of power is the answer where power needs to be transferred from a superior governmental body (such as central power) to an inferior one (such as at regional level). A genuine desire for devolution can enable different approaches to government and policy-making to develop Nepal without breaking the country into pieces, and opening up processes which could be misused in the present situation.
In the United Kingdom too, devolution became one of the key issues in the build up to the 1997 election to the House of Representatives when Labour Party promised this issue as one of its manifesto pledges and to introduce a devolved form of government for Wales, Sctoland and Northern Ireland. True to this commitment, since 1998, the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom has undergone dramatic changes.
These changes essentially involved the setting up of an elected regional assembly whose powers were carefully and clearly defined by the national government. These powers did not usually include major financial powers such as tax collection, the raising of taxes etc (though the Scottish Parliament has minor tax raising powers), the control of the armed forces or an input into foreign policy decisions. Such issues continue to be controlled by the central government.
For example, Scotland has a Parliament now elected every four years on the Additional Member System of proportional representation. The National Assembly for Wales is also elected by the Additional Member System of proportional representation. It does not have the power to make primary legislation, but enjoys extensive executive powers and may make secondary legislation.
The Belfast Agreement reached in Northern Ireland in April 1998, was approved in a referendum the following month, and also opened the avenues for devolution. One of the new institutions created following this agreement was an elected Assembly with a similar range of legislative and executive powers to the Scottish Parliament.
What has emerged from the long tidal flows of devolution—from the 1998 onwards—is a uniquely rich, open and outward looking culture and a distinctive set of values which influence British institutions. Already one can see—from the new Regional Development Agencies bringing jobs and investment to each region, to greater local powers over housing, health, skills and transport —there is a real and growing devolution of power away from Whitehall and down to individual regions and communities.
There is a pressure to do even more to move away from the old Britain weakened by decades of 'Whitehall knows best', towards a new Britain strengthened by local centers of energy, initiative, dynamism and decision-making. It is a process that goes on without creating havoc.
Sometimes people forget this is devolution; it is not a form of federalism. The essence of devolution is not to be found in a particular set of broken pieces but in the institutionalization of particular relationships among the participants of political life. Nepal is capable of doing this without hurting anybody. Should this country not plan something like this without being too introvert?
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com
Posted on: 2008-08-27 20:34:40 (Server Time)
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=158585
Nepal has been declared a federal state by the Interim Constitution. Although this does not establish ethnicity as the fundamental principle of the federal system of government that Nepal is going to adopt, there is a strong possibility that ethnicity will be taken as a major criterion in the formulation of the Nepali scheme of federalism. The opinion being floated from different established corners in the country does not give any better indication.
The issue of federalism in several developing countries has often been one for polemic rather than reasoned analysis. This is what is happening in Nepal as well. The lack of congruence between past and present in Nepal—as well as rivalry between competing contemporary federal visions and neighborhood interests—are likely to be brought into play during the conceptualization and implementation of federalism by the Constituent Assembly. It is yet to be seen whether this empowers the people who deserve empowerment, or gives way to those quarters that should not have any voice in Nepal's political process.
A key problem in this regard is the lack of seriousness on the part of the politicians and party-sponsored activists as to what they want out of federalism. So far there is complete absence of mechanisms for dealing with a multitude of conflicting federal visions competing for the same areas. Except the three political districts in the Kathmandu valley, the nation as a whole has no clue as to what is federalism; and if this is what they want as a gift from the so-called 'New Nepal.' On top of this, even if public opinion should crystallize around one particular vision, the current establishment and its loyal opposition do not have strong willingness to prevent others mounting new challenges against it. The danger is that situations like these could create further chaos and chronic administrative instability.
The issue here is the initial Maoist proposal for federalizing Nepal by creating eight states—Khasan, Tharuwan, Magart, Tamuwan, Tamang, Newa, Kirat and Madhesh—which got a further twist when the CPN-Maoist unveiled their election manifesto in early March 2008. This manifesto further proposed to restructure the unitary state into 11 autonomous federal states and two other sub-states within them keeping in mind what they described as the country's "ethnic composition, geographical contiguity, linguistic base and economic viability."
The Maoist manifesto proposed a three-tier state structure — centre, autonomous federal states and local bodies — with specific rights and responsibility among them, but essentially clinging to their strong ethnic territoriality. They have proposed Seti-Mahakali and Bheri-Karnali federal states based on their geographical appropriateness while the rest — Magarat, Tharuwan, Tamuwan, Newa:, Tamsaling, Kirat, Limbuwan, Kochila and Madhes — have been based on ethnicity. Within the Madhes autonomous state, three sub-states — Mithila, Bhojpura and Awadh — have also been proposed on linguistic basis. The Maoists have also reiterated that every autonomous state will have the right to self-determination.
In this scheme of federalism, the only ethnic territory that has not been given its proper name is Khasan. The party has not explained so far why the state of Khasan has been dropped from their original scheme, and why Seti-Mahakali and Bheri-Karnali federal states have been created in its place giving new name to this territory. The identity of Khasan (the abode of Khas people) is no less historical and real than the rest of the other Nepali communities. They are indigenous to the land; and are the principal inhabitant of their region from time immemorial. If ethnic identity is to be stimulated as a political criterion, then there is no reason why the Khas community—which is one of the major ethnic groups of the country—should be knocked down this way from Nepal's political map.
It is not necessary to refer to the written history of Nepal, and their general role in the nation building. If one is to go by Mahabharata epic—something written before the three thousand years before the birth of Jesus —note that Khasas (including Kirants) have fought war even with Krishna, Karna, Yudhistira and many rulers of the South Asian plains to safeguard the independence and sovereignty of their land.
For a Khas, whether one is a so-called Bahun or a 'sanojat,' the whole of Nepal is his or her home, and there is no ethnic loyalty to any particular piece of land inside the country. They don't say this is ours and that is yours. This is how they have lived in this land since antiquity. They live everywhere; they have equal dedication and concerns for the whole country. They do not want to see the country divided into ethnic line.
Additionally, for Khasas, Nepal is too heterogeneous for ethnic federalism to work. While devolution of power to the territories which require this for empowerment and economic development is fine and must be pursued with urgency, federalising the country along the ethnic criteria is definitely a torturous move, which might weaken this land and all Nepalis commitment for it. This does not mean that they do not have an ethnic territory; and do not mind losing it.
This author has always emphasized that Nepal needs devolution of power to the territories—ethnic or geographical—in an objective basis. Federalism is not necessarily the major issue here. Devolution of power is the answer where power needs to be transferred from a superior governmental body (such as central power) to an inferior one (such as at regional level). A genuine desire for devolution can enable different approaches to government and policy-making to develop Nepal without breaking the country into pieces, and opening up processes which could be misused in the present situation.
In the United Kingdom too, devolution became one of the key issues in the build up to the 1997 election to the House of Representatives when Labour Party promised this issue as one of its manifesto pledges and to introduce a devolved form of government for Wales, Sctoland and Northern Ireland. True to this commitment, since 1998, the constitutional structure of the United Kingdom has undergone dramatic changes.
These changes essentially involved the setting up of an elected regional assembly whose powers were carefully and clearly defined by the national government. These powers did not usually include major financial powers such as tax collection, the raising of taxes etc (though the Scottish Parliament has minor tax raising powers), the control of the armed forces or an input into foreign policy decisions. Such issues continue to be controlled by the central government.
For example, Scotland has a Parliament now elected every four years on the Additional Member System of proportional representation. The National Assembly for Wales is also elected by the Additional Member System of proportional representation. It does not have the power to make primary legislation, but enjoys extensive executive powers and may make secondary legislation.
The Belfast Agreement reached in Northern Ireland in April 1998, was approved in a referendum the following month, and also opened the avenues for devolution. One of the new institutions created following this agreement was an elected Assembly with a similar range of legislative and executive powers to the Scottish Parliament.
What has emerged from the long tidal flows of devolution—from the 1998 onwards—is a uniquely rich, open and outward looking culture and a distinctive set of values which influence British institutions. Already one can see—from the new Regional Development Agencies bringing jobs and investment to each region, to greater local powers over housing, health, skills and transport —there is a real and growing devolution of power away from Whitehall and down to individual regions and communities.
There is a pressure to do even more to move away from the old Britain weakened by decades of 'Whitehall knows best', towards a new Britain strengthened by local centers of energy, initiative, dynamism and decision-making. It is a process that goes on without creating havoc.
Sometimes people forget this is devolution; it is not a form of federalism. The essence of devolution is not to be found in a particular set of broken pieces but in the institutionalization of particular relationships among the participants of political life. Nepal is capable of doing this without hurting anybody. Should this country not plan something like this without being too introvert?
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com
Posted on: 2008-08-27 20:34:40 (Server Time)
Sunday, May 25, 2008
नेपाली क्यानभासका रङहरू पीताम्बर शर्मा
मुलुकमा उठिरहेको जातीय समस्याको भौगोलिक लेखाजोखा
ने पालमा 'जातीय समस्या' विगत दर्ुइ शताब्दीदेखि थुप्रि“दै गएको हो । हाम्रँे सर्न्दर्भमा जातीय समस्या भन्नाले सामाजिक-सांस्कृतिक, आर्थिक-राजनीतिक र जनसाङ्ख्यिक अधिकार उपभोग गर्ने मामिलामा विभिन्न समूह र सामाजिक वर्गका बीचमा रहेको असमानताबाट उत्पन्न समस्यालाई बुझ्नुपर्ने हुन्छ । अन्यत्रजस्तै नेपालको जातीय समस्या मूल रूपमा पहिचान, असमानता र भेदभावको समस्या हो । यसका जातीय र क्षेत्रीय दुवै आयामहरू छन् । उदाहरणका लागि, क्षेत्रीहरूको बाहुल्य भएर पनि मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिम नेपालका पहाडी र हिमाली भेग सामाजिक-आर्थिक विकासका सूचकका दृष्टिले सबैभन्दा पछाडि छन् ।
नेपाल राज्य सुरुवातदेखि नै हिन्दू धर्म, खस भाषा र खस-बाहुनको पर्वतिया संस्कृति र मान्यतामा आधारति सामाजिक र सांस्कृतिक एकरूपता स्थापनाको पक्षपाती रह्यो । नेपालमा जातीय विभेदको जरो नै यही सोचको ऐतिहासिक निरन्तरता हो । अहिले जातीयताको सवाल उठ्नुका पछाडि तीनवटा परस्पर सम्बन्धित आधार छन् ।
िपहिलो, राज्यद्वारा योजनाबद्ध ढङ्गले भेदभाव गरएिका र सीमान्तकृत जाति/जातको वास्तविक ऐतिहासिक गुनासो ।
दिोस्रो, जातीय, भाषिक र सांस्कृतिक पहिचानको राजनीतिको उदय ।
रि तेस्रो, वर्तमान समयमा नसुहाउने र विडम्बनापर्ूण्ा ऐतिहासिक परम्परालाई समावेशी, अग्रगामी, धर्मनिरपेक्ष, प्रगतिशील र प्रजातान्त्रिक राज्यमा रूपान्तरण गर्नका लागि राज्यको पुनःसंरचनाको आवश्यकता ।
जाति/जात र पहाड/मधेस
नेपालमा खास गरेर उत्तर र पर्ूवबाट बसाइ“ सरेर आएका मङ्गोल -जनजाति) तथा दक्षिण र पश्चिमबाट आएका ककेसियाली -जात) समूहका मानिसहरूको बसोवासबाट जनसाङ्ख्यिक विस्तार भएको हो । त्यसैले नेपाललाई बसाइ“सराइबाट निर्मित देश भनिन्छ । नेपालका सबैथरी आदिवासी-जनजातिहरू ककेसियाली जात समूहका मानिसहरू आउनुभन्दा पहिल्यैदेखि नेपालमा बसोवास गर्दैनथे । उदाहरणका लागि माइकल ओपिजले खुम्बू क्षेत्रका सम्भवतः सबैभन्दा पुराना बासिन्दा शर्ेपाहरू सन् १५३३ तिर मात्रै त्यहा“ आएको देखाएका छन् ।
कतिपय अन्य जातिले पनि भिन्न ऐतिहासिक कालखण्डमा नेपाल आएर भिन्न तरकिाले समाज र संस्कृतिलाई संयोजन गरेको देखिन्छ । त्यस्तै, पहाड र तर्राईका जात समूहका भिन्नताको प्रमुख कारक उनीहरूको सांस्कृतिक संयोजन र सङ्क्रमणको भिन्न अनुभव हो । दुवैको उद्गम भारत हो तर समय बित्दै जा“दा पहाडका बाहुन र क्षेत्रीले बेग्लै भाषाको विकास गरे । र, आफ्नो संस्कृतिलाई जीवनयापनको अवस्था अनि भौगोलिक-राजनीतिक आवश्यकता अनुसार संयोजन गरेे ।
तर्राईमा चाहि“ यसो गर्नुपर्ने खण्ड नै बनेन । तर्राई भौगोलिक रूपले पर्ूवदेखि पश्चिमसम्म वारपार फैलिएको एउटै भौगोलिक एकाइ होइन । बरु, यो तीनवटा पृथक् एकाइले बनेको छ- झापादेखि पर्सर्ााम फैलिएको पर्ूर्वी तर्राई, नवलपरासी, रूपन्देही र कपिलवस्तु मिलेर बनेको मध्य तर्राई र बा“केदेखि कञ्चनपुरसम्मको पश्चिम तर्राई । ऐतिहासिक हिसाबले मधेस र भित्री मधेसबीचको सांस्कृतिक भिन्नता के हो भने मधेसमा तर्राईका विभिन्न जात र भाषिक समूह -मैथिली, भोजपुरी र अवधी भाषी), विभिन्न जनजाति -थारू, राजवंशी आदि), विभिन्न धर्मावलम्बी -हिन्दू र मुसलमान) अनि भारतीय मूलका आप्रवासी -मारवाडी, बङ्गाली, शिख आदि)को बसोवास छ भने भित्री मधेसमा मूल रूपमा थारू, बोटे, दनुवार, दर्राई, कुमाल, माझी, राजी र राउटेजस्ता आदिवासी बसोवास गर्छन् ।
स्पष्टतः प्रदेशका रूपमा मधेसको बोध र प्रादेशिक पहिचानका रूपमा मधेसीको सोच एउटै कुरा होइनन्् । सांस्कृतिक, भाषिक अथवा धार्मिक दृष्टिले एक रूप र्सव-मधेसी पहिचान छैनन् । मधेसीहरूलाई एकताबद्ध बनाउने साझा तत्त्व भनेको ऐतिहासिक कालदेखि राज्यले उनीहरूप्रति गरेको विभेदपर्ूण्ा र असमावेशी व्यवहार हो ।
सन् २००१ को जनगणनामा पहिचान गरएिका एक सय जाति/जातमध्ये छवटा जाति/जातको मात्र जनसङ्ख्या कुल जनसङ्ख्याको पा“च प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ र १८ जाति/जातको जनसङ् ख्या कुल जनसङ्ख्याको एक प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ । यिनमा सङ्ख्यात्मक हिसाबले क्रमशः क्षेत्री, बाहुन, मगर, थारू, तामाङ, नेवार, मुसलमान, कामी, यादव, र्राई, गुरुङ, दमाई, लिम्बू, ठकुरी, सार्की, तेली, चमार र कोइरी पर्छन् । यिनीहरू कुल जनसङ्ख्याको ८१ प्रतिशत छन् । एक लाखभन्दा बढी जनसङ्ख्या भएका जाति/जात ३१ मात्र छन् । अर्थात् ६९ जाति/जातको जनसङ्ख्या एक लाखभन्दा कम छ । दलित तथा गैरदलित गरी ५३ जात समूहको जनसङ्ख्या मुलुकको कुल जनसङ् ख्याको ५८.२ प्रतिशत रहेको छ ।
प्राकृतिक प्रदेशका आधारमा जिल्लाहरूको जनसङ्ख्याको बनोट हर्ेदा के देखिन्छ भने पहाडी र हिमाली जिल्लाका ९६ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी मानिसहरू पहाडी-हिमाली जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूहका छन् । उता तर्राईका २० जिल्लामा तर्राई जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूहका जाति/जातको सङ्ख्या -मुसलमानसहित) त्यहा“को कुल जनसङ्ख्याको ६४.३ प्रतिशत मात्र छ । यसले तर्राईमा पहाडी जाति/जातको विस्तारमा बसाइ“सराइले महत्त्वपर्ूण्ा भूमिका खेलेको देखाउ“छ । तर्राईमा रहेका पहाडी जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूहका मानिसहरूमध्ये ६४.३ प्रतिशत जात समूहका र ३५.७ प्रतिशत जनजाति समूहका रहेका छन् । तर्राईका छवटा जिल्लामा पहाडी जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूह बहुमतमा छन् ।
समग्रमा हर्ेदा पहाडी/हिमाली जिल्लाहरूमा आठवटा मुख्य जाति/जातको वर्चस्व रहेको छ । तिनमा पर्ूवमा लिम्बू, र्राई र क्षेत्री, मध्यमा तामाङ र नेवार, पश्चिममा मगर, गुरुङ र बाहुन अनि मध्यपश्चिम र सुदूरपश्चिममा क्षेत्रीहरू पर्छन् । तर्राईका जिल्लाहरूमा कुनै पनि जनजाति/जातको वर्चस्व त्यति स्पष्ट छैन । मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिममा थारूहरूलाई छाडेर मध्य तर्राईका मुसलमान अनि पर्ूर्वी तर्राईका यादव र बाहुनजस्ता मुख्य जनजाति/जात अन्य जनजाति/जातका तुलनामा अलिकति मात्र धेरै छन् ।
मुख्य जाति/जातको वितरण, बाहुल्य र फैलावट
गाविस/नगरपालिका तहमा सन् २००१ को तथ्याङ्कका आधारमा गरएिको विश्लेषणले के देखाउ“छ भने क्षेत्री, मगर, तामाङ, थारू र बाहुन गरी पा“च जनजाति/जातको एक-एक सयभन्दा बढी गाविसमा बाहुल्य छ । क्षेत्री कुल ९ सय २८ गाविसमा सबभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेको छ भने बाहुन ४ सय ९१, मगर ३ सय ६२, थारू ३ सय १०, यादव ३ सय ८, तामाङ ३ सय १, मुसलमान २ सय ७८, र्राई १ सय ८०, गुरुङ १ सय ३० र लिम्बू १ सय २१ गाविसमा सबैभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेका छन् ।
नेपालका कुल गाविस तथा नगरपालिकाहरूको ३२ प्रतिशत अर्थात् जम्मा १ हजार २ सय ९१ गाविस/नपामा एउटा न एउटा जाति/जात बहुमतमा रहेको देखिन्छ । थुप्रै अल्पसङ्ख्यक जातजातिहरूको आफ्नै थातथलो छ । उदाहरणका निम्ति चेपाङहरू चार गाविसमा बहुमतमा छन् । थामीहरू तीन, छन्त्याल र सुनुवार दर्ुइ-दर्ुइ, लेप्चा र पहरी एक-एक गाविसमा बहुसङ्ख्यामा रहेका छन् । जम्मा ७२ जनजाति/जात समूह कुनै पनि गाविसमा बहुमतमा छैनन् भने ३७ जनजाति/जात कुनै पनि गाविसमा सबैभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेका छैनन् ।
अर्को चाखलाग्दो तथ्य के छ भने मुख्य जाति/जात समूहको फैलावट पनि व्यापक छ । क्षेत्री कुल १ हजार ९ सय ३० गाविस/नपामा त्यहा“को जनसङ्ख्याको १० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढीको अनुपातमा छन् । त्यस्तै, बाहुन १ हजार ४ सय ६७, मगर ८ सय ७०, थारू ४ सय ३७, तामाङ ६ सय ३२, नेवार ३ सय ७०, मुसलमान ४ सय ९७, यादव ५ सय ७३, र्राई ३ सय ३५, गुरुङ ३ सय २ र लिम्बू १ सय ९१ गाविस/नपामा त्यहा“को जनसङ्ख्याको १० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढीको अनुपातमा छन् ।
गाविसमा जाति/जातको सबभन्दा बढी जनसङ्ख्या र एउटै जाति/जात भएका छिमेकी गाविसहरूको सन्निकटताका दर्ुइ आधारमा जातीय प्रदेश र क्षेत्रहरू छुट्याउन सकिन्छ । यसरी पहाडतिर जम्मा आठवटा जातीय प्रदेशहरूको पहिचान गर्न सकिन्छ । ती हुन् ः मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिममा क्षेत्री, पश्चिमोत्तर भेगमा गुरुङ, पश्चिममा मगर, मध्यमा तामाङ, काठमाडा“ै उपत्यकामा नेवार, पर्ूवमा र्राई, पूर्वोत्तरमा शर्ेपा र सबैभन्दा पर्ूवमा लिम्बू ।
तर, यी जाति/जातगत प्रदेशहरूमा पनि खास जाति/जातहरूको बाहुल्य भएका क्षेत्रहरू छन् । मगर प्रदेशको दक्षिण-पश्चिममा अर्घर्ाा“चीदेखि उत्तर-पर्ूवमा कास्कीसम्म बाहुनको घना आवादी भएको चौडा क्षेत्र छ । त्यस्तै, तामाङ प्रदेशको पर्ूवाेत्तर भागका दोलखा र रामेछापमा क्षेत्रीको सघन आवादी छ । दक्षिणी सङ्खुवासभा, भोजपुर र उत्तरी धनकुटामा पनि क्षेत्रीको उल्लेख्य बसोवास छ । अनि लिम्बू प्रदेशको दक्षिण ताप्लेजुङदेखि पर्ूर्वी इलामसम्म र्राईको सापेक्षिक घना आवादी छ ।
तर्राईमा मध्य र पश्चिम तर्राई थारूहरूको सापेक्षिक बाहुल्य भएको प्रदेशका रूपमा देखिन्छ भने पर्ूर्वी तर्राईको सप्तरीदेखि रौतहटसम्म यादवको प्रदेशका रूपमा । पर्ूर्वी तर्राईको झापा र पर्ूर्वी मोरङमा बाहुनको सघन बसोवास छ । त्यस्तै पश्चिमी मोरङ, सुनसरी र उत्तरी सप्तरीमा थारूको उल्लेख्य बसोवास छ । उत्तरी रौतहटदेखि उत्तरी पर्सर्ाा पनि थारूको बाहुल्य छ । चितवनमा थारू र बाहुन-क्षेत्रीको मिश्रति आवादी बाहुल्यमा छ । पश्चिम तर्राईमा रूपन्देही-कपिलवस्तु र बा“के गरी दुइटा मुसलमानको सापेक्षिक बाहुल्य भएका क्षेत्र छन् ।
पहाडका दलितबाहेकका चार जात -क्षेत्री, बाहुन, ठकुरी र सन्न्यासी)लाई गाविसको सबैभन्दा ठूलो एउटै समूहका रूपमा लिने हो भने मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिमका साथसाथै यस समूहको बलियो उपस्िथति झन्डै मध्य पहाड र तर्राईको उत्तरी भेगभर िनै छ । यो समूह कुल १ हजार ७ सय ६० गाविसमा सबैभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेको छ भने १ हजार ४३ गाविसमा यस समूहको बहुमत छ । अर्काे शब्दमा भन्दा देशका हरेक चारमध्ये एक गाविसमा यस समूहको बहुमत छ । पर्ूर्वी, मध्य र पश्चिमी पहाड र पश्चिम तथा सुदूरपश्चिम तर्राईका १ हजार ३ सय ४६ गाविसमा आदिवासी-जनजातिको बहुमत छ । अर्थात्, देशका हरेक तीनमध्ये एक गाविसमा आदिवासी-जनजाति बहुमतमा छन् ।
दलित समूह नेपालको सबैभन्दा शोषित, पीडित र समाजद्वारा ठगिएको समूह हो । २००१ को जनगणना अनुसार नेपालमा दलितको जनसङ् ख्या १३ प्रतिशतका हाराहारीमा छ, जुन कुनै पनि जनजाति समूहभन्दा बढी हो । तर, जनजातिहरूको जस्तै दलितहरूको आफ्नो भौगोलिक क्षेत्र छैन । जम्मा ३१ वटा जिल्लामा दलितको जनसङ्ख्या १२ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ । पश्चिमका आठवटा जिल्लाहरू बाग्लुङ, जाजरकोट, र्सर्ुखेत, दैलेख, कालीकोट, अछाम, बाजुरा र डोटीमा उनीहरूको जनसङ्ख्या त्यस जिल्लाको कुल जनसङ्ख्याको २३ देखि ३० प्रतिशतसम्म छ । नेपालका १२ वटा गाविसमा मात्रै उनीहरूको बहुमत छ । पश्चिम र सुदूरपश्चिम पहाड र पर्ूर्वी तर्राईका २ सय ११ गाविसमा दलितको जनसङ्ख्या त्यस गाविसको जनसङ्ख्याको ३० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ ।
तर्राईका जात समूहको सबैभन्दा ठूलो आवादी र घनत्व पर्ूर्वी तर्राईका जिल्लामा छ । सुनसरीदेखि पर्सर्ााम नौवटा जिल्लाका दक्षिणी सिमानाका लहरै रहेका ६ सय ९९ वटा गाविसमा तर्राईका जाति/जातको जनसङ्ख्या त्यहा“को कुल जनसङ्ख्याको ७५ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ । अर्थात् त्यहा“का प्रत्येक चार जनामध्ये तीन जना मानिस तर्राई जाति/जातका छन् । तर्राईका जाति/जातको यस्तो घनत्वले समानता अनि मधेसको क्षेत्रीय स्वायत्तताको आन्दोलन मूल रूपमा किन पर्ूर्वी तर्राईमा केन्द्रित भयो भन्ने कुराको पनि जवाफ दिन्छ ।
बसाइ“सराइ
ने पालमा 'जातीय समस्या' विगत दर्ुइ शताब्दीदेखि थुप्रि“दै गएको हो । हाम्रँे सर्न्दर्भमा जातीय समस्या भन्नाले सामाजिक-सांस्कृतिक, आर्थिक-राजनीतिक र जनसाङ्ख्यिक अधिकार उपभोग गर्ने मामिलामा विभिन्न समूह र सामाजिक वर्गका बीचमा रहेको असमानताबाट उत्पन्न समस्यालाई बुझ्नुपर्ने हुन्छ । अन्यत्रजस्तै नेपालको जातीय समस्या मूल रूपमा पहिचान, असमानता र भेदभावको समस्या हो । यसका जातीय र क्षेत्रीय दुवै आयामहरू छन् । उदाहरणका लागि, क्षेत्रीहरूको बाहुल्य भएर पनि मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिम नेपालका पहाडी र हिमाली भेग सामाजिक-आर्थिक विकासका सूचकका दृष्टिले सबैभन्दा पछाडि छन् ।
नेपाल राज्य सुरुवातदेखि नै हिन्दू धर्म, खस भाषा र खस-बाहुनको पर्वतिया संस्कृति र मान्यतामा आधारति सामाजिक र सांस्कृतिक एकरूपता स्थापनाको पक्षपाती रह्यो । नेपालमा जातीय विभेदको जरो नै यही सोचको ऐतिहासिक निरन्तरता हो । अहिले जातीयताको सवाल उठ्नुका पछाडि तीनवटा परस्पर सम्बन्धित आधार छन् ।
िपहिलो, राज्यद्वारा योजनाबद्ध ढङ्गले भेदभाव गरएिका र सीमान्तकृत जाति/जातको वास्तविक ऐतिहासिक गुनासो ।
दिोस्रो, जातीय, भाषिक र सांस्कृतिक पहिचानको राजनीतिको उदय ।
रि तेस्रो, वर्तमान समयमा नसुहाउने र विडम्बनापर्ूण्ा ऐतिहासिक परम्परालाई समावेशी, अग्रगामी, धर्मनिरपेक्ष, प्रगतिशील र प्रजातान्त्रिक राज्यमा रूपान्तरण गर्नका लागि राज्यको पुनःसंरचनाको आवश्यकता ।
जाति/जात र पहाड/मधेस
नेपालमा खास गरेर उत्तर र पर्ूवबाट बसाइ“ सरेर आएका मङ्गोल -जनजाति) तथा दक्षिण र पश्चिमबाट आएका ककेसियाली -जात) समूहका मानिसहरूको बसोवासबाट जनसाङ्ख्यिक विस्तार भएको हो । त्यसैले नेपाललाई बसाइ“सराइबाट निर्मित देश भनिन्छ । नेपालका सबैथरी आदिवासी-जनजातिहरू ककेसियाली जात समूहका मानिसहरू आउनुभन्दा पहिल्यैदेखि नेपालमा बसोवास गर्दैनथे । उदाहरणका लागि माइकल ओपिजले खुम्बू क्षेत्रका सम्भवतः सबैभन्दा पुराना बासिन्दा शर्ेपाहरू सन् १५३३ तिर मात्रै त्यहा“ आएको देखाएका छन् ।
कतिपय अन्य जातिले पनि भिन्न ऐतिहासिक कालखण्डमा नेपाल आएर भिन्न तरकिाले समाज र संस्कृतिलाई संयोजन गरेको देखिन्छ । त्यस्तै, पहाड र तर्राईका जात समूहका भिन्नताको प्रमुख कारक उनीहरूको सांस्कृतिक संयोजन र सङ्क्रमणको भिन्न अनुभव हो । दुवैको उद्गम भारत हो तर समय बित्दै जा“दा पहाडका बाहुन र क्षेत्रीले बेग्लै भाषाको विकास गरे । र, आफ्नो संस्कृतिलाई जीवनयापनको अवस्था अनि भौगोलिक-राजनीतिक आवश्यकता अनुसार संयोजन गरेे ।
तर्राईमा चाहि“ यसो गर्नुपर्ने खण्ड नै बनेन । तर्राई भौगोलिक रूपले पर्ूवदेखि पश्चिमसम्म वारपार फैलिएको एउटै भौगोलिक एकाइ होइन । बरु, यो तीनवटा पृथक् एकाइले बनेको छ- झापादेखि पर्सर्ााम फैलिएको पर्ूर्वी तर्राई, नवलपरासी, रूपन्देही र कपिलवस्तु मिलेर बनेको मध्य तर्राई र बा“केदेखि कञ्चनपुरसम्मको पश्चिम तर्राई । ऐतिहासिक हिसाबले मधेस र भित्री मधेसबीचको सांस्कृतिक भिन्नता के हो भने मधेसमा तर्राईका विभिन्न जात र भाषिक समूह -मैथिली, भोजपुरी र अवधी भाषी), विभिन्न जनजाति -थारू, राजवंशी आदि), विभिन्न धर्मावलम्बी -हिन्दू र मुसलमान) अनि भारतीय मूलका आप्रवासी -मारवाडी, बङ्गाली, शिख आदि)को बसोवास छ भने भित्री मधेसमा मूल रूपमा थारू, बोटे, दनुवार, दर्राई, कुमाल, माझी, राजी र राउटेजस्ता आदिवासी बसोवास गर्छन् ।
स्पष्टतः प्रदेशका रूपमा मधेसको बोध र प्रादेशिक पहिचानका रूपमा मधेसीको सोच एउटै कुरा होइनन्् । सांस्कृतिक, भाषिक अथवा धार्मिक दृष्टिले एक रूप र्सव-मधेसी पहिचान छैनन् । मधेसीहरूलाई एकताबद्ध बनाउने साझा तत्त्व भनेको ऐतिहासिक कालदेखि राज्यले उनीहरूप्रति गरेको विभेदपर्ूण्ा र असमावेशी व्यवहार हो ।
सन् २००१ को जनगणनामा पहिचान गरएिका एक सय जाति/जातमध्ये छवटा जाति/जातको मात्र जनसङ्ख्या कुल जनसङ्ख्याको पा“च प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ र १८ जाति/जातको जनसङ् ख्या कुल जनसङ्ख्याको एक प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ । यिनमा सङ्ख्यात्मक हिसाबले क्रमशः क्षेत्री, बाहुन, मगर, थारू, तामाङ, नेवार, मुसलमान, कामी, यादव, र्राई, गुरुङ, दमाई, लिम्बू, ठकुरी, सार्की, तेली, चमार र कोइरी पर्छन् । यिनीहरू कुल जनसङ्ख्याको ८१ प्रतिशत छन् । एक लाखभन्दा बढी जनसङ्ख्या भएका जाति/जात ३१ मात्र छन् । अर्थात् ६९ जाति/जातको जनसङ्ख्या एक लाखभन्दा कम छ । दलित तथा गैरदलित गरी ५३ जात समूहको जनसङ्ख्या मुलुकको कुल जनसङ् ख्याको ५८.२ प्रतिशत रहेको छ ।
प्राकृतिक प्रदेशका आधारमा जिल्लाहरूको जनसङ्ख्याको बनोट हर्ेदा के देखिन्छ भने पहाडी र हिमाली जिल्लाका ९६ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी मानिसहरू पहाडी-हिमाली जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूहका छन् । उता तर्राईका २० जिल्लामा तर्राई जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूहका जाति/जातको सङ्ख्या -मुसलमानसहित) त्यहा“को कुल जनसङ्ख्याको ६४.३ प्रतिशत मात्र छ । यसले तर्राईमा पहाडी जाति/जातको विस्तारमा बसाइ“सराइले महत्त्वपर्ूण्ा भूमिका खेलेको देखाउ“छ । तर्राईमा रहेका पहाडी जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूहका मानिसहरूमध्ये ६४.३ प्रतिशत जात समूहका र ३५.७ प्रतिशत जनजाति समूहका रहेका छन् । तर्राईका छवटा जिल्लामा पहाडी जनसाङ्ख्यिक समूह बहुमतमा छन् ।
समग्रमा हर्ेदा पहाडी/हिमाली जिल्लाहरूमा आठवटा मुख्य जाति/जातको वर्चस्व रहेको छ । तिनमा पर्ूवमा लिम्बू, र्राई र क्षेत्री, मध्यमा तामाङ र नेवार, पश्चिममा मगर, गुरुङ र बाहुन अनि मध्यपश्चिम र सुदूरपश्चिममा क्षेत्रीहरू पर्छन् । तर्राईका जिल्लाहरूमा कुनै पनि जनजाति/जातको वर्चस्व त्यति स्पष्ट छैन । मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिममा थारूहरूलाई छाडेर मध्य तर्राईका मुसलमान अनि पर्ूर्वी तर्राईका यादव र बाहुनजस्ता मुख्य जनजाति/जात अन्य जनजाति/जातका तुलनामा अलिकति मात्र धेरै छन् ।
मुख्य जाति/जातको वितरण, बाहुल्य र फैलावट
गाविस/नगरपालिका तहमा सन् २००१ को तथ्याङ्कका आधारमा गरएिको विश्लेषणले के देखाउ“छ भने क्षेत्री, मगर, तामाङ, थारू र बाहुन गरी पा“च जनजाति/जातको एक-एक सयभन्दा बढी गाविसमा बाहुल्य छ । क्षेत्री कुल ९ सय २८ गाविसमा सबभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेको छ भने बाहुन ४ सय ९१, मगर ३ सय ६२, थारू ३ सय १०, यादव ३ सय ८, तामाङ ३ सय १, मुसलमान २ सय ७८, र्राई १ सय ८०, गुरुङ १ सय ३० र लिम्बू १ सय २१ गाविसमा सबैभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेका छन् ।
नेपालका कुल गाविस तथा नगरपालिकाहरूको ३२ प्रतिशत अर्थात् जम्मा १ हजार २ सय ९१ गाविस/नपामा एउटा न एउटा जाति/जात बहुमतमा रहेको देखिन्छ । थुप्रै अल्पसङ्ख्यक जातजातिहरूको आफ्नै थातथलो छ । उदाहरणका निम्ति चेपाङहरू चार गाविसमा बहुमतमा छन् । थामीहरू तीन, छन्त्याल र सुनुवार दर्ुइ-दर्ुइ, लेप्चा र पहरी एक-एक गाविसमा बहुसङ्ख्यामा रहेका छन् । जम्मा ७२ जनजाति/जात समूह कुनै पनि गाविसमा बहुमतमा छैनन् भने ३७ जनजाति/जात कुनै पनि गाविसमा सबैभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेका छैनन् ।
अर्को चाखलाग्दो तथ्य के छ भने मुख्य जाति/जात समूहको फैलावट पनि व्यापक छ । क्षेत्री कुल १ हजार ९ सय ३० गाविस/नपामा त्यहा“को जनसङ्ख्याको १० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढीको अनुपातमा छन् । त्यस्तै, बाहुन १ हजार ४ सय ६७, मगर ८ सय ७०, थारू ४ सय ३७, तामाङ ६ सय ३२, नेवार ३ सय ७०, मुसलमान ४ सय ९७, यादव ५ सय ७३, र्राई ३ सय ३५, गुरुङ ३ सय २ र लिम्बू १ सय ९१ गाविस/नपामा त्यहा“को जनसङ्ख्याको १० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढीको अनुपातमा छन् ।
गाविसमा जाति/जातको सबभन्दा बढी जनसङ्ख्या र एउटै जाति/जात भएका छिमेकी गाविसहरूको सन्निकटताका दर्ुइ आधारमा जातीय प्रदेश र क्षेत्रहरू छुट्याउन सकिन्छ । यसरी पहाडतिर जम्मा आठवटा जातीय प्रदेशहरूको पहिचान गर्न सकिन्छ । ती हुन् ः मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिममा क्षेत्री, पश्चिमोत्तर भेगमा गुरुङ, पश्चिममा मगर, मध्यमा तामाङ, काठमाडा“ै उपत्यकामा नेवार, पर्ूवमा र्राई, पूर्वोत्तरमा शर्ेपा र सबैभन्दा पर्ूवमा लिम्बू ।
तर, यी जाति/जातगत प्रदेशहरूमा पनि खास जाति/जातहरूको बाहुल्य भएका क्षेत्रहरू छन् । मगर प्रदेशको दक्षिण-पश्चिममा अर्घर्ाा“चीदेखि उत्तर-पर्ूवमा कास्कीसम्म बाहुनको घना आवादी भएको चौडा क्षेत्र छ । त्यस्तै, तामाङ प्रदेशको पर्ूवाेत्तर भागका दोलखा र रामेछापमा क्षेत्रीको सघन आवादी छ । दक्षिणी सङ्खुवासभा, भोजपुर र उत्तरी धनकुटामा पनि क्षेत्रीको उल्लेख्य बसोवास छ । अनि लिम्बू प्रदेशको दक्षिण ताप्लेजुङदेखि पर्ूर्वी इलामसम्म र्राईको सापेक्षिक घना आवादी छ ।
तर्राईमा मध्य र पश्चिम तर्राई थारूहरूको सापेक्षिक बाहुल्य भएको प्रदेशका रूपमा देखिन्छ भने पर्ूर्वी तर्राईको सप्तरीदेखि रौतहटसम्म यादवको प्रदेशका रूपमा । पर्ूर्वी तर्राईको झापा र पर्ूर्वी मोरङमा बाहुनको सघन बसोवास छ । त्यस्तै पश्चिमी मोरङ, सुनसरी र उत्तरी सप्तरीमा थारूको उल्लेख्य बसोवास छ । उत्तरी रौतहटदेखि उत्तरी पर्सर्ाा पनि थारूको बाहुल्य छ । चितवनमा थारू र बाहुन-क्षेत्रीको मिश्रति आवादी बाहुल्यमा छ । पश्चिम तर्राईमा रूपन्देही-कपिलवस्तु र बा“के गरी दुइटा मुसलमानको सापेक्षिक बाहुल्य भएका क्षेत्र छन् ।
पहाडका दलितबाहेकका चार जात -क्षेत्री, बाहुन, ठकुरी र सन्न्यासी)लाई गाविसको सबैभन्दा ठूलो एउटै समूहका रूपमा लिने हो भने मध्य र सुदूरपश्चिमका साथसाथै यस समूहको बलियो उपस्िथति झन्डै मध्य पहाड र तर्राईको उत्तरी भेगभर िनै छ । यो समूह कुल १ हजार ७ सय ६० गाविसमा सबैभन्दा ठूलो समूहका रूपमा रहेको छ भने १ हजार ४३ गाविसमा यस समूहको बहुमत छ । अर्काे शब्दमा भन्दा देशका हरेक चारमध्ये एक गाविसमा यस समूहको बहुमत छ । पर्ूर्वी, मध्य र पश्चिमी पहाड र पश्चिम तथा सुदूरपश्चिम तर्राईका १ हजार ३ सय ४६ गाविसमा आदिवासी-जनजातिको बहुमत छ । अर्थात्, देशका हरेक तीनमध्ये एक गाविसमा आदिवासी-जनजाति बहुमतमा छन् ।
दलित समूह नेपालको सबैभन्दा शोषित, पीडित र समाजद्वारा ठगिएको समूह हो । २००१ को जनगणना अनुसार नेपालमा दलितको जनसङ् ख्या १३ प्रतिशतका हाराहारीमा छ, जुन कुनै पनि जनजाति समूहभन्दा बढी हो । तर, जनजातिहरूको जस्तै दलितहरूको आफ्नो भौगोलिक क्षेत्र छैन । जम्मा ३१ वटा जिल्लामा दलितको जनसङ्ख्या १२ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ । पश्चिमका आठवटा जिल्लाहरू बाग्लुङ, जाजरकोट, र्सर्ुखेत, दैलेख, कालीकोट, अछाम, बाजुरा र डोटीमा उनीहरूको जनसङ्ख्या त्यस जिल्लाको कुल जनसङ्ख्याको २३ देखि ३० प्रतिशतसम्म छ । नेपालका १२ वटा गाविसमा मात्रै उनीहरूको बहुमत छ । पश्चिम र सुदूरपश्चिम पहाड र पर्ूर्वी तर्राईका २ सय ११ गाविसमा दलितको जनसङ्ख्या त्यस गाविसको जनसङ्ख्याको ३० प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ ।
तर्राईका जात समूहको सबैभन्दा ठूलो आवादी र घनत्व पर्ूर्वी तर्राईका जिल्लामा छ । सुनसरीदेखि पर्सर्ााम नौवटा जिल्लाका दक्षिणी सिमानाका लहरै रहेका ६ सय ९९ वटा गाविसमा तर्राईका जाति/जातको जनसङ्ख्या त्यहा“को कुल जनसङ्ख्याको ७५ प्रतिशतभन्दा बढी छ । अर्थात् त्यहा“का प्रत्येक चार जनामध्ये तीन जना मानिस तर्राई जाति/जातका छन् । तर्राईका जाति/जातको यस्तो घनत्वले समानता अनि मधेसको क्षेत्रीय स्वायत्तताको आन्दोलन मूल रूपमा किन पर्ूर्वी तर्राईमा केन्द्रित भयो भन्ने कुराको पनि जवाफ दिन्छ ।
बसाइ“सराइ
Wednesday, May 7, 2008
Implications of a hung CA
By DR BIPIN ADHIKARI
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=146272
The Kathmandu Post, May 8, 2008
The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007, which pledged a Constituent Assembly (CA) to the people, has done so without enumerating its constituent powers whatsoever.
All that this constitution provides for is a guarantee of the basic rights of the Nepali people to participate in a free and impartial election to the CA and frame a constitution for themselves through this organ. The Interim Constitution does not guarantee that the sovereign house will have no limitations in its constituent powers or that it will not be constrained by the decisions of the interim legislature or the interim government on the basis of this constitution or by any executive agreement that it has signed with rebellious groups in the pre-election period.
As such, the guarantee of the basic rights of the Nepali people to frame a new constitution does not imply the unencumbered sovereign capacity of the CA to draft a new constitution of its choice without any limitations on its powers.
The assembly is intended to operate within two concrete a priori formulations. Article 159 declares that (a) Nepal shall be a federal state and (b) a country with a democratic republican setup. The first formulation concerns sharing of sovereign powers between political units, which do not exist till now in the Nepali consciousness, and the second concerns dispensing with the monarchy, which allegedly lost its credibility in the fight against the Maoists.
As to these preconditions, while the nature of the federal state is something still to be worked on, Article 159 requires that the transition to a republic be made at the first meeting of the CA. To give effect to this formulation, the parties in the alliance even dropped the clause requiring a simple parliamentary majority by the third amendment to the Constitution.
It is just by chance that the operation of this provision is tied to Article 75 which ensures that all questions submitted for a decision to the CA, except as otherwise provided in Part 7 of the constitution, must be decided by a majority vote of the members present and voting. Accordingly, the alleged first meeting must also pass a motion to this effect by a working majority in the House in order to abolish the monarchy.
Similarly, the constitutional declaration that Nepal shall be a federal state comes ahead of its due date. Ordinarily, it is the elected delegates of the CA, who have the responsibility of deciding what form of government is best for Nepal, who should make the decision. With this clause inserted into the constitution, the debate has now been carefully shifted to the issue of autonomy, which had not been the demand of the natives of this country so far.
This shows the enormity of the contradictions that the CA finds itself in. A genuine CA by definition can only be convoked under conditions of full democratic liberties of the delegates, permitting the participation of all the parties concerned, and without any external or internal limitations on its constitution making powers.
A CA is not a legislature that is supposed to be governed under express or implied limitations on its constituent powers. It is a self-sufficient source of power from which all specifics of a state are to be derived. As a corollary, it should be able to exert paramount control over the constitution while making the frame of the government and its administration. While the Interim Constitution might have given birth to the CA in the normal course of political development, the assembly can chart out its future ways without any guidance from the parent document and forge ahead with its own terms and conditions. Otherwise, there is no difference between a normal legislature and a CA intending to give a fresh start.
However, the faulty Interim Constitution has outsmarted its architects in two very surprising ways. First, as far as the general rule of the constitution is concerned, the members of the CA must vote on each and every article of the draft constitution in order to pass it; and failing unanimous passage of the motion, at least two-thirds of the total members of the CA must give it a unanimous exit to turn it into the new constitution.
So, even if the first meeting of the assembly, for example, were to abolish the monarchy and establish a republican state by a simple majority, the move cannot in anyway pre-empt the power of the CA members to reintroduce a new motion restoring the monarchy in due time and pass it by a two-thirds majority. There is nothing in the constitution which can restrain this motion; and as long as there are people in the House to table such a motion and to support it by a required strength, the monarch is here to stay. This means that, contrary to popular belief, the king's fate will remain undecided until the new constitution is promulgated. Same with the declaration of a federal state.
Secondly, the faulty system of proportional representation that the architects of the Interim Constitution introduced with little knowledge of the ensuing structure has already generated a mixed political lot in the assembly. As no party has an outright majority, what we have is a hung CA, and there are many parties in the House which do not share the political platform of the Seven-Party Alliance (which had monopolized the process of drafting the Interim Constitution). The House is compelled to work with these uneasy political partners.
As the constitution does not provide for the dissolution of the assembly on any ground, except when the objective has been accomplished, a hung assembly is bound to work out either a coalition government or a minority government with the support of these backbenchers. The requirement of a two-thirds majority in the constitution making process will force the ruling elite to redefine issues like federalism and monarchy in the overall context of the state's restructuring. The smaller parties in power will make a lot of difference when major constitutional policies are sorted out in the House.
There are some who have already started an exercise (in futility) to help produce a national government eliminating the prospect of any opposition in the constitution making process. The Seven-Party Alliance is almost an exercise of this type, which has already served its purpose. But it is inconceivable that it can continue any longer in the new scenario. In any case, such a national government has a very poor reputation historically. Whether it is the national government of GP Koirala (2006-08) or of British Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain (which held office from 1931 until 1940), all have been a liability to the nation. Fortunately, a loyal opposition is going to be prominent in Nepal for the next two years. This opposition is going to make sure that the nation is in safe hands.
Additionally, a coalition government led by a party which has lost its credibility before the majority of the people can be equally destructive to the cause of the nation. Nepal is surely familiar with the hung parliament after 1995. It is perhaps not out of place to mention that even in the 1974 general election in the UK, sitting Prime Minister Edward Heath had refused to resign at first, attempting to build a coalition government despite winning fewer seats than the then opposition Labour Party. So if Prime Minister Koirala is still trying to hang on to his post, it should come as no surprise. But the House itself is going to take offence against such ambitions.
The structural limits on the power of the CA and unauthorized normative or inspirational impositions are going to grow fainter due to the operation of the hung CA. This is good for the country.
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com
Posted on: 2008-05-07 20:01:25 (Server Time)
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=146272
The Kathmandu Post, May 8, 2008
The Interim Constitution of Nepal 2007, which pledged a Constituent Assembly (CA) to the people, has done so without enumerating its constituent powers whatsoever.
All that this constitution provides for is a guarantee of the basic rights of the Nepali people to participate in a free and impartial election to the CA and frame a constitution for themselves through this organ. The Interim Constitution does not guarantee that the sovereign house will have no limitations in its constituent powers or that it will not be constrained by the decisions of the interim legislature or the interim government on the basis of this constitution or by any executive agreement that it has signed with rebellious groups in the pre-election period.
As such, the guarantee of the basic rights of the Nepali people to frame a new constitution does not imply the unencumbered sovereign capacity of the CA to draft a new constitution of its choice without any limitations on its powers.
The assembly is intended to operate within two concrete a priori formulations. Article 159 declares that (a) Nepal shall be a federal state and (b) a country with a democratic republican setup. The first formulation concerns sharing of sovereign powers between political units, which do not exist till now in the Nepali consciousness, and the second concerns dispensing with the monarchy, which allegedly lost its credibility in the fight against the Maoists.
As to these preconditions, while the nature of the federal state is something still to be worked on, Article 159 requires that the transition to a republic be made at the first meeting of the CA. To give effect to this formulation, the parties in the alliance even dropped the clause requiring a simple parliamentary majority by the third amendment to the Constitution.
It is just by chance that the operation of this provision is tied to Article 75 which ensures that all questions submitted for a decision to the CA, except as otherwise provided in Part 7 of the constitution, must be decided by a majority vote of the members present and voting. Accordingly, the alleged first meeting must also pass a motion to this effect by a working majority in the House in order to abolish the monarchy.
Similarly, the constitutional declaration that Nepal shall be a federal state comes ahead of its due date. Ordinarily, it is the elected delegates of the CA, who have the responsibility of deciding what form of government is best for Nepal, who should make the decision. With this clause inserted into the constitution, the debate has now been carefully shifted to the issue of autonomy, which had not been the demand of the natives of this country so far.
This shows the enormity of the contradictions that the CA finds itself in. A genuine CA by definition can only be convoked under conditions of full democratic liberties of the delegates, permitting the participation of all the parties concerned, and without any external or internal limitations on its constitution making powers.
A CA is not a legislature that is supposed to be governed under express or implied limitations on its constituent powers. It is a self-sufficient source of power from which all specifics of a state are to be derived. As a corollary, it should be able to exert paramount control over the constitution while making the frame of the government and its administration. While the Interim Constitution might have given birth to the CA in the normal course of political development, the assembly can chart out its future ways without any guidance from the parent document and forge ahead with its own terms and conditions. Otherwise, there is no difference between a normal legislature and a CA intending to give a fresh start.
However, the faulty Interim Constitution has outsmarted its architects in two very surprising ways. First, as far as the general rule of the constitution is concerned, the members of the CA must vote on each and every article of the draft constitution in order to pass it; and failing unanimous passage of the motion, at least two-thirds of the total members of the CA must give it a unanimous exit to turn it into the new constitution.
So, even if the first meeting of the assembly, for example, were to abolish the monarchy and establish a republican state by a simple majority, the move cannot in anyway pre-empt the power of the CA members to reintroduce a new motion restoring the monarchy in due time and pass it by a two-thirds majority. There is nothing in the constitution which can restrain this motion; and as long as there are people in the House to table such a motion and to support it by a required strength, the monarch is here to stay. This means that, contrary to popular belief, the king's fate will remain undecided until the new constitution is promulgated. Same with the declaration of a federal state.
Secondly, the faulty system of proportional representation that the architects of the Interim Constitution introduced with little knowledge of the ensuing structure has already generated a mixed political lot in the assembly. As no party has an outright majority, what we have is a hung CA, and there are many parties in the House which do not share the political platform of the Seven-Party Alliance (which had monopolized the process of drafting the Interim Constitution). The House is compelled to work with these uneasy political partners.
As the constitution does not provide for the dissolution of the assembly on any ground, except when the objective has been accomplished, a hung assembly is bound to work out either a coalition government or a minority government with the support of these backbenchers. The requirement of a two-thirds majority in the constitution making process will force the ruling elite to redefine issues like federalism and monarchy in the overall context of the state's restructuring. The smaller parties in power will make a lot of difference when major constitutional policies are sorted out in the House.
There are some who have already started an exercise (in futility) to help produce a national government eliminating the prospect of any opposition in the constitution making process. The Seven-Party Alliance is almost an exercise of this type, which has already served its purpose. But it is inconceivable that it can continue any longer in the new scenario. In any case, such a national government has a very poor reputation historically. Whether it is the national government of GP Koirala (2006-08) or of British Prime Ministers Ramsay MacDonald, Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain (which held office from 1931 until 1940), all have been a liability to the nation. Fortunately, a loyal opposition is going to be prominent in Nepal for the next two years. This opposition is going to make sure that the nation is in safe hands.
Additionally, a coalition government led by a party which has lost its credibility before the majority of the people can be equally destructive to the cause of the nation. Nepal is surely familiar with the hung parliament after 1995. It is perhaps not out of place to mention that even in the 1974 general election in the UK, sitting Prime Minister Edward Heath had refused to resign at first, attempting to build a coalition government despite winning fewer seats than the then opposition Labour Party. So if Prime Minister Koirala is still trying to hang on to his post, it should come as no surprise. But the House itself is going to take offence against such ambitions.
The structural limits on the power of the CA and unauthorized normative or inspirational impositions are going to grow fainter due to the operation of the hung CA. This is good for the country.
lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com
Posted on: 2008-05-07 20:01:25 (Server Time)
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
संघीय शासनको सान्दर्भिकता
http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnepalinews.php?nid=141810
Kantipur, Chait 12, 2064
डा विपिन अधिकारी
क्यानाडाको क्विन्स विश्वविद्यालयका प्राध्यापक रोनाल्ड वाट्सको 'एकात्मक राज्यप्रणाली विखण्डनकारी हुन्छ' शर्ीष्ाकमा दि काठमाडौं पोष्टमा छापिएको एउटा अन्तर्वार्ताले धेरैको ध्यानाकर्षा गरेको छ । संघीयताका विद्वान र अनुभवी वाट्सको दाबी के छ भने जात, धर्म, जातीयताका आधारमा नभए पनि जनसंख्या, भूगोल, आर्थिक विकासजस्ता विविध आधारमा नेपाललाई संघीय संरचनामा बदल्न सकिन्छ । उनको भनाइमा विखण्डन रोक्न संघीयता जरुरी छ । यसो त विखण्डनका आन्दोलन संघीय राज्यमा पनि भएका छन् । यसै आधारमा मात्र मुलुकको संविधान एकात्मक हुने वा संघीय हुने विवेचना गरिनु हु“दैन । यसबाहेक पनि वाट्सका अन्य भनाइ नेपालका लागि कति सान्दर्भिक छन्, यकिन गर्न जरुरी छ ।
संघीयता आफैंमा नराम्रो प्रचलन होइन । विश्वका करिब दर्ुइ दर्जनबाहेक सबै मुलुकमा एकात्मक राज्यप्रणाली छ । कतिपय मुलुक पर्ूण्ा प्रजातान्त्रिक छन् र आर्थिक विकासका दृष्टिले प्रगतिशील पनि मानिन्छन् । संघीयता अपनाउने मुलुकमध्ये पनि मलेसिया तथा भारतजस्ता आधाभन्दा बढी मुलुकको शक्ति विभाजन केन्द्रीयताको पक्षमै देखिन्छ । औंलामा गन्न सकिने देशले मात्र राज्य र संघलाई समान हैसियतमा स्वीकार गरेका छन् । तथाकथित आत्मनिर्ण्र्ााो अधिकार ग्यारेन्टी गर्ने मुलुक दर्ुलभ छन् ।
प्रचार-प्रसार गरिएजति एकात्मक शासन लोकप्रिय शासन प्रणाली होइन भन्ने दाबी शंंकास्पद मान्नर्ुपर्छ । स्पेन तथा बेल्जियमजस्ता देशले आफूलाई निश्चित राजनीतिक यथार्थका आधारमा संघीयतामा परिणत गरेको सत्य हो । परिवर्तित अवस्थामा पनि उनीहरूम्ााझ एकात्मक विशेषता नभएका होइनन् । कपडाको जुत्ता लगाउने कि छालाको भन्ने प्रश्नको निरूपण कुनै पनि देशको धरातलीय यथार्थका आधारमा गरिनर्ुपर्छ । त्यस आधारमा नेपालले संघीयतामा हामफाली हाल्नुपर्ने कुनै विशेष आकर्षा छैन ।
संघीय शासन पद्धति किन भन्ने उचित जवाफ भेटिएको छैन । नेकपा -माओवादी) को राजनीतिक कार्यक्रमको रूपमा सुरुदेखि स्थापित यो विषय हाल मधेसमुखी दलले ज्ाोडतोडले उठाएका छन् । उनीहरूका एजेन्डा बढी आक्रामक तथा सनातनी संघीयताको व्यवस्था
-जस्तो संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका वा क्यानाडा) तर्फउन्मुख प्रस्टै छ । यसका दर्ुइ कारण छन्, पहिलो, संघीयताको आधार भनेको राजनीतिक इकाइका रूपमा राज्यहरूको स्वतन्त्र अस्तित्व तथा आत्मनिर्ण्र्ााो अधिकार प्रयोग गर्न सकिने स्थिति हो । दोस्रो, विगतमा स्पष्ट आधार नभेटिए पनि ऐतिहासिक राजनीतिक इकाइको रूपमा आफूलाई स्थापित गराउने चाहना हो । अन्य दल मूलभूत रूपमा पछाडि परेका जाति तथा समुदायको सशक्तिकरणको उद्देश्यबाट निर्देशित देखिन्छन् । संघीयतै किन भन्नेमा उनीहरू दिग्भ्रमित छन् । मधेसमुखी दलहरूले संघीयतालाई सामरिक दृष्टिकोणले हेरिदि“दा उनीहरूका अप्ठेरा झन् दर्ुइ गुना बढेका छन् । कुनै पार्टर्ीीनि एकात्मक राज्य पद्धति विरोधी देखि“दैनन् । अहिलेको बाह्य प्रभाव र निर्देशित राजनीतिक वातावरणमा धान्नैपर्ने राजनीतिक कार्यक्रमका रूपमा संघीयता स्वीकार गर्न बाध्य देखिन्छछन् ।
एकात्मक राज्यकै रूपमा रहनु नेपालको राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ अनुकूल छ । एकात्मकता राष्ट्रिय एकताको प्रतीक हो । एकात्मक राज्यमा दक्ष एवं कुशल शासन तथा नीति निर्धारण तथा राज्य सञ्चालन कार्य सजिलो हुन्छ । राष्ट्रप्रतिको निष्ठा तथा भक्तिलाई अंशबन्डा गर्नुपर्ने स्थिति हु“दैन । राज्य इकाइ र संघबीच शक्ति विभाजन दुर्बोध्य काम हो । मुलुकलाई विभिन्न राज्य इकाइबीच संर्घष्ाको घानमा हाल्नुु हु“दैन । संविधान तथा कानुनमा संशोधन पनि एकात्मक व्यवस्थामै सजिलो हुन्छ । अप्ठेरा परिस्थिति तथा विशेष अवसर तथा चुनौती सामना गर्ने क्षमता पनि एकात्मक सरकारमा बढी हुन्छ । र्
खर्चको हिसाबले अहिलेको परिपाटी संघीय परिपाटीभन्दा फाइदाजनक हुन्छ । शान्ति सुरक्षाजस्ता विषय र त्यसभन्दा पनि संकटकालीन स्थितिमा अहिलेको प्रणाली र्सवाधिक उपयुक्त हुन्छ । नेपाल आर्थिक विकासका सम्भावना तथा भूमण्डलीकरणको परिपे्रक्ष्यमा साहसी निर्ण्र्ाालिने क्षमतावान तथा फर्ुर्तिलो हुन आवश्यक छ । आज अमेरिका तथा क्यानाडा जस्ता देशले नया“ संविधान बनाउने हो भने यस्तो संविधान बनाउनेछन्, जसले शक्तिशाली केन्द्रीय सरकार सुनिश्चित गर्न सकोस् । त्यस्तो सरकारले मात्र राष्ट्रको सुरक्षा तथा प्रतिरक्षा गर्न सक्छ ।
नेपालमा नेपाली जातिको इच्छा र आकांक्षा परिवर्तनको बाहक हुनपाएको छैन । शदीऔंदेखि एकात्मक राज्यका रूपमा रहेको नेपाल तथा सामाजिक-आर्थिक तथा भावनात्मक रूपमा पनि अखण्ड राष्ट्रको स्वाभिमान स्थापित भइसकेको मुलुकको राजनीतिक धरातल बलपर्ूवक परिवर्तन गरी सिमान्तीकृत गर्नुपर्ने कारण बुझ्न सकिएको छैन । संघीयताको नाममा देशलाई दस चिरा पारेर यसबाट अक्षम राजनीतिज्ञ तथा संंकर्ीण्ा पक्षपोषकका लागि अवसर सिर्जना भने गर्न सकिन्छ ।
जतिसुकै ढिपी गरे पनि ऊबेलाको अमेरिकामाजस्तो नेपालीम्ाा राज्य वा समुदायहरूको संघीय राज्य बनाउने सांगठनिक क्षमता तथा त्यसलाई निर्देशन दिने जेर्फसन वा जेम्स मेडिसनजस्ता क्षमतावान नेता प्ानि छैनन् । हाम्रो राजनीतिक नेतृत्वको क्षमता, स्तर वा विवेक निकट भविष्यमै चमत्कारिक ढंगले बढ्ने सम्भावना पनि छैन । विभाजित राज्यप्रणाली समन्वय गरी एकताको सूत्रमा बा“ध्नसक्ने सांगठनिक क्षमता तथा नेतृत्व विकास हुन समय लाग्नेछ ।
प्रजातन्त्र विकासको औजार पनि हो । नेपालमा स्थानीय स्वशासनलाई धेरै वर्षेखि यसै अर्थमा हेरि“दैछ । कतिपय क्षेत्रमा राम्रा तथा उल्लेखनीय काम भएका छन् भने कतिपयमा सुधारका टड्कारा सम्भावना देखिएका छन् । एकात्मक स्वरूपभित्र राज्यको पुनःसंरचना हुनसक्ने तथा पीडित वा उपेक्षित जाति तथा समुदायको अधिकारको ग्यारेन्टी तथा स्थानीय स्वशासन गर्न सकिने स्थिति सधैं छ । उनीहरूले खोजेको समानता तथा सहभागिता कार्यान्वयन गर्न देशको शक्ति तथा सम्भावना निर्वाध प्रयोग गर्न सकिने स्थिति छ । यति हु“दाहु“दै पनि यो मुलुकलाई सम्झौताबाट स्थापित राज्यका रूपमा पुनःलेखन गर्न किन पर्यो, आर्श्चर्य लाग्छ । दलित, जनजाति वा मधेसीलाई सशक्तिकरण गर्ने उद्देश्य हो भने केन्द्रीय शासनको मूलधारमा उनीहरूलाई सिधै स्थापित किन गरि“दैन -
नेपाललाई एकात्मक राज्यको अवधारणामै विकास निर्माण गरिनर्ुपर्छ भन्नु अहिलेको राजनीतिक वा प्रशासनिक स्वरूपलाई निरन्तरता दिनर्ुपर्छ भन्ने होइन । सही कार्यका लागि कर्ुतर्कले जित्न आवश्यक छैन । क्षेत्रीय विकासका आवश्यकता तथा राष्ट्रिय एकतालाई स“गस“गै लान सकिन्छ । स्थानीय स्वशासन बलियो बनाई संघीयताका आधार निरन्तर प्रयासबाट बिस्तारै आर्जन गर्न सकिन्छ । स्थानीय स्तरमा र्सार्वजनिक कार्यहरूप्रति उदासीनता हटाउन सकिन्छ । हरेक धर्म, जातजाति, संस्कृति तथा क्षेत्रलाई समान सुविधा तथा पीडित तथा उपेक्षित समुदायलाई अतिरिक्त संरक्षण गर्न देशको अंशबन्डा जरुरी छैन । नत केन्द्र र इकाइ सरकारलाई परस्पर स्वतन्त्र तथा समकक्ष बनाउन जरुरी छ । प्रजातान्त्रिक संगठन र कानुनी राज्यको परम्परा कमजोर हु“दै गएको मुलुकमा संवैधानिक क्लिष्टता वा सत्ता बा“डफा“डले देशको पुनःनिर्माणमा जटिलतामात्र थप्न सक्छ । मुलुकको विकेन्द्रीकरण कार्यक्रम अर्न्तर्गत वर्षोनि सरकारबाट विनियोजित पा“च-सात लाख खर्च गर्ने क्षमता नभइसकेको गाउ“घरलाई संघीयता कति सजिलो होला अनुमान गर्न सकिन्छ ।
प्रा वाट्सका विचार धेरै प्राज्ञिक छन् । उनले नेपालको भू-राजनीतिक स्थितिलाई उक्त अन्तर्वार्ता तथा उनले जीटीजेट तथा युएनडीपीद्वारा आयोजित कार्यशालामा प्रस्तुत गरेको कार्यपत्रमा विवेचना गर्न भ्याएनन् । छिमेक असल हु“दो हो त नेपालले हालको दुरवस्था खप्नुपर्ने थिएन । मुलुक भित्रको आतंकवाद वा औपनिवेशिक चलखेल कसले धान्न सक्छ सधैं - यो पक्ष उचित मूल्याङ्कन गर्दा संघीयताबारे धेरै दाबी यसै खुकुलो भएर जानेछन् । यस स्थितिमा संघीयता केवल बोकाको मुखमा कुभिन्डो चरितार्थ नहोला र -
Posted on: 2008-03-24 22:05:13
Kantipur, Chait 12, 2064
डा विपिन अधिकारी
क्यानाडाको क्विन्स विश्वविद्यालयका प्राध्यापक रोनाल्ड वाट्सको 'एकात्मक राज्यप्रणाली विखण्डनकारी हुन्छ' शर्ीष्ाकमा दि काठमाडौं पोष्टमा छापिएको एउटा अन्तर्वार्ताले धेरैको ध्यानाकर्षा गरेको छ । संघीयताका विद्वान र अनुभवी वाट्सको दाबी के छ भने जात, धर्म, जातीयताका आधारमा नभए पनि जनसंख्या, भूगोल, आर्थिक विकासजस्ता विविध आधारमा नेपाललाई संघीय संरचनामा बदल्न सकिन्छ । उनको भनाइमा विखण्डन रोक्न संघीयता जरुरी छ । यसो त विखण्डनका आन्दोलन संघीय राज्यमा पनि भएका छन् । यसै आधारमा मात्र मुलुकको संविधान एकात्मक हुने वा संघीय हुने विवेचना गरिनु हु“दैन । यसबाहेक पनि वाट्सका अन्य भनाइ नेपालका लागि कति सान्दर्भिक छन्, यकिन गर्न जरुरी छ ।
संघीयता आफैंमा नराम्रो प्रचलन होइन । विश्वका करिब दर्ुइ दर्जनबाहेक सबै मुलुकमा एकात्मक राज्यप्रणाली छ । कतिपय मुलुक पर्ूण्ा प्रजातान्त्रिक छन् र आर्थिक विकासका दृष्टिले प्रगतिशील पनि मानिन्छन् । संघीयता अपनाउने मुलुकमध्ये पनि मलेसिया तथा भारतजस्ता आधाभन्दा बढी मुलुकको शक्ति विभाजन केन्द्रीयताको पक्षमै देखिन्छ । औंलामा गन्न सकिने देशले मात्र राज्य र संघलाई समान हैसियतमा स्वीकार गरेका छन् । तथाकथित आत्मनिर्ण्र्ााो अधिकार ग्यारेन्टी गर्ने मुलुक दर्ुलभ छन् ।
प्रचार-प्रसार गरिएजति एकात्मक शासन लोकप्रिय शासन प्रणाली होइन भन्ने दाबी शंंकास्पद मान्नर्ुपर्छ । स्पेन तथा बेल्जियमजस्ता देशले आफूलाई निश्चित राजनीतिक यथार्थका आधारमा संघीयतामा परिणत गरेको सत्य हो । परिवर्तित अवस्थामा पनि उनीहरूम्ााझ एकात्मक विशेषता नभएका होइनन् । कपडाको जुत्ता लगाउने कि छालाको भन्ने प्रश्नको निरूपण कुनै पनि देशको धरातलीय यथार्थका आधारमा गरिनर्ुपर्छ । त्यस आधारमा नेपालले संघीयतामा हामफाली हाल्नुपर्ने कुनै विशेष आकर्षा छैन ।
संघीय शासन पद्धति किन भन्ने उचित जवाफ भेटिएको छैन । नेकपा -माओवादी) को राजनीतिक कार्यक्रमको रूपमा सुरुदेखि स्थापित यो विषय हाल मधेसमुखी दलले ज्ाोडतोडले उठाएका छन् । उनीहरूका एजेन्डा बढी आक्रामक तथा सनातनी संघीयताको व्यवस्था
-जस्तो संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका वा क्यानाडा) तर्फउन्मुख प्रस्टै छ । यसका दर्ुइ कारण छन्, पहिलो, संघीयताको आधार भनेको राजनीतिक इकाइका रूपमा राज्यहरूको स्वतन्त्र अस्तित्व तथा आत्मनिर्ण्र्ााो अधिकार प्रयोग गर्न सकिने स्थिति हो । दोस्रो, विगतमा स्पष्ट आधार नभेटिए पनि ऐतिहासिक राजनीतिक इकाइको रूपमा आफूलाई स्थापित गराउने चाहना हो । अन्य दल मूलभूत रूपमा पछाडि परेका जाति तथा समुदायको सशक्तिकरणको उद्देश्यबाट निर्देशित देखिन्छन् । संघीयतै किन भन्नेमा उनीहरू दिग्भ्रमित छन् । मधेसमुखी दलहरूले संघीयतालाई सामरिक दृष्टिकोणले हेरिदि“दा उनीहरूका अप्ठेरा झन् दर्ुइ गुना बढेका छन् । कुनै पार्टर्ीीनि एकात्मक राज्य पद्धति विरोधी देखि“दैनन् । अहिलेको बाह्य प्रभाव र निर्देशित राजनीतिक वातावरणमा धान्नैपर्ने राजनीतिक कार्यक्रमका रूपमा संघीयता स्वीकार गर्न बाध्य देखिन्छछन् ।
एकात्मक राज्यकै रूपमा रहनु नेपालको राष्ट्रिय स्वार्थ अनुकूल छ । एकात्मकता राष्ट्रिय एकताको प्रतीक हो । एकात्मक राज्यमा दक्ष एवं कुशल शासन तथा नीति निर्धारण तथा राज्य सञ्चालन कार्य सजिलो हुन्छ । राष्ट्रप्रतिको निष्ठा तथा भक्तिलाई अंशबन्डा गर्नुपर्ने स्थिति हु“दैन । राज्य इकाइ र संघबीच शक्ति विभाजन दुर्बोध्य काम हो । मुलुकलाई विभिन्न राज्य इकाइबीच संर्घष्ाको घानमा हाल्नुु हु“दैन । संविधान तथा कानुनमा संशोधन पनि एकात्मक व्यवस्थामै सजिलो हुन्छ । अप्ठेरा परिस्थिति तथा विशेष अवसर तथा चुनौती सामना गर्ने क्षमता पनि एकात्मक सरकारमा बढी हुन्छ । र्
खर्चको हिसाबले अहिलेको परिपाटी संघीय परिपाटीभन्दा फाइदाजनक हुन्छ । शान्ति सुरक्षाजस्ता विषय र त्यसभन्दा पनि संकटकालीन स्थितिमा अहिलेको प्रणाली र्सवाधिक उपयुक्त हुन्छ । नेपाल आर्थिक विकासका सम्भावना तथा भूमण्डलीकरणको परिपे्रक्ष्यमा साहसी निर्ण्र्ाालिने क्षमतावान तथा फर्ुर्तिलो हुन आवश्यक छ । आज अमेरिका तथा क्यानाडा जस्ता देशले नया“ संविधान बनाउने हो भने यस्तो संविधान बनाउनेछन्, जसले शक्तिशाली केन्द्रीय सरकार सुनिश्चित गर्न सकोस् । त्यस्तो सरकारले मात्र राष्ट्रको सुरक्षा तथा प्रतिरक्षा गर्न सक्छ ।
नेपालमा नेपाली जातिको इच्छा र आकांक्षा परिवर्तनको बाहक हुनपाएको छैन । शदीऔंदेखि एकात्मक राज्यका रूपमा रहेको नेपाल तथा सामाजिक-आर्थिक तथा भावनात्मक रूपमा पनि अखण्ड राष्ट्रको स्वाभिमान स्थापित भइसकेको मुलुकको राजनीतिक धरातल बलपर्ूवक परिवर्तन गरी सिमान्तीकृत गर्नुपर्ने कारण बुझ्न सकिएको छैन । संघीयताको नाममा देशलाई दस चिरा पारेर यसबाट अक्षम राजनीतिज्ञ तथा संंकर्ीण्ा पक्षपोषकका लागि अवसर सिर्जना भने गर्न सकिन्छ ।
जतिसुकै ढिपी गरे पनि ऊबेलाको अमेरिकामाजस्तो नेपालीम्ाा राज्य वा समुदायहरूको संघीय राज्य बनाउने सांगठनिक क्षमता तथा त्यसलाई निर्देशन दिने जेर्फसन वा जेम्स मेडिसनजस्ता क्षमतावान नेता प्ानि छैनन् । हाम्रो राजनीतिक नेतृत्वको क्षमता, स्तर वा विवेक निकट भविष्यमै चमत्कारिक ढंगले बढ्ने सम्भावना पनि छैन । विभाजित राज्यप्रणाली समन्वय गरी एकताको सूत्रमा बा“ध्नसक्ने सांगठनिक क्षमता तथा नेतृत्व विकास हुन समय लाग्नेछ ।
प्रजातन्त्र विकासको औजार पनि हो । नेपालमा स्थानीय स्वशासनलाई धेरै वर्षेखि यसै अर्थमा हेरि“दैछ । कतिपय क्षेत्रमा राम्रा तथा उल्लेखनीय काम भएका छन् भने कतिपयमा सुधारका टड्कारा सम्भावना देखिएका छन् । एकात्मक स्वरूपभित्र राज्यको पुनःसंरचना हुनसक्ने तथा पीडित वा उपेक्षित जाति तथा समुदायको अधिकारको ग्यारेन्टी तथा स्थानीय स्वशासन गर्न सकिने स्थिति सधैं छ । उनीहरूले खोजेको समानता तथा सहभागिता कार्यान्वयन गर्न देशको शक्ति तथा सम्भावना निर्वाध प्रयोग गर्न सकिने स्थिति छ । यति हु“दाहु“दै पनि यो मुलुकलाई सम्झौताबाट स्थापित राज्यका रूपमा पुनःलेखन गर्न किन पर्यो, आर्श्चर्य लाग्छ । दलित, जनजाति वा मधेसीलाई सशक्तिकरण गर्ने उद्देश्य हो भने केन्द्रीय शासनको मूलधारमा उनीहरूलाई सिधै स्थापित किन गरि“दैन -
नेपाललाई एकात्मक राज्यको अवधारणामै विकास निर्माण गरिनर्ुपर्छ भन्नु अहिलेको राजनीतिक वा प्रशासनिक स्वरूपलाई निरन्तरता दिनर्ुपर्छ भन्ने होइन । सही कार्यका लागि कर्ुतर्कले जित्न आवश्यक छैन । क्षेत्रीय विकासका आवश्यकता तथा राष्ट्रिय एकतालाई स“गस“गै लान सकिन्छ । स्थानीय स्वशासन बलियो बनाई संघीयताका आधार निरन्तर प्रयासबाट बिस्तारै आर्जन गर्न सकिन्छ । स्थानीय स्तरमा र्सार्वजनिक कार्यहरूप्रति उदासीनता हटाउन सकिन्छ । हरेक धर्म, जातजाति, संस्कृति तथा क्षेत्रलाई समान सुविधा तथा पीडित तथा उपेक्षित समुदायलाई अतिरिक्त संरक्षण गर्न देशको अंशबन्डा जरुरी छैन । नत केन्द्र र इकाइ सरकारलाई परस्पर स्वतन्त्र तथा समकक्ष बनाउन जरुरी छ । प्रजातान्त्रिक संगठन र कानुनी राज्यको परम्परा कमजोर हु“दै गएको मुलुकमा संवैधानिक क्लिष्टता वा सत्ता बा“डफा“डले देशको पुनःनिर्माणमा जटिलतामात्र थप्न सक्छ । मुलुकको विकेन्द्रीकरण कार्यक्रम अर्न्तर्गत वर्षोनि सरकारबाट विनियोजित पा“च-सात लाख खर्च गर्ने क्षमता नभइसकेको गाउ“घरलाई संघीयता कति सजिलो होला अनुमान गर्न सकिन्छ ।
प्रा वाट्सका विचार धेरै प्राज्ञिक छन् । उनले नेपालको भू-राजनीतिक स्थितिलाई उक्त अन्तर्वार्ता तथा उनले जीटीजेट तथा युएनडीपीद्वारा आयोजित कार्यशालामा प्रस्तुत गरेको कार्यपत्रमा विवेचना गर्न भ्याएनन् । छिमेक असल हु“दो हो त नेपालले हालको दुरवस्था खप्नुपर्ने थिएन । मुलुक भित्रको आतंकवाद वा औपनिवेशिक चलखेल कसले धान्न सक्छ सधैं - यो पक्ष उचित मूल्याङ्कन गर्दा संघीयताबारे धेरै दाबी यसै खुकुलो भएर जानेछन् । यस स्थितिमा संघीयता केवल बोकाको मुखमा कुभिन्डो चरितार्थ नहोला र -
Posted on: 2008-03-24 22:05:13
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
“Knowing federalism as a concept is one thing; but devising it as a workable model for Nepal is quite another” – Bipin Adhikari
http://www.nepalnews.com.np/contents/2008/englishweekly/spotlight/mar/mar14/interview.php#2
SPOTLIGHT, VOL. 27, NO. 27, March 14, 2008 (Chaitra 01 2064 B.S.)
A consulting lawyer and constitutional analyst, Bipin Adhikari is a keen observer of the ongoing transitional process in Nepal. The Commentatory on the Nepalese Constitution that he co-authored with other constitutional lawyers in 1998 remains an outstanding piece of work on the 1990 Constitution and Nepal’s experiment with constitutionalism. A doctor of constitutional law, Adhikari spoke to SPOTLIGHT about the issue of federalism that Nepal has been confronting in recent months. Excerpts:
How do you see the rule of law situation in the country?
It is undoubtedly pathetic. There is lawlessness, wariness and lack of due process everywhere. The concept of legality seems to have become a fairy tale.
Why is the situation like this?
There are many reasons. But this situation mainly owes to the system of unlimited government that has been installed in the country. It is bringing changes through means that are not legal or legitimate.
Some lawyers argue that there is already an interim Constitution and a representative legislature, although not elected, to check the government?
If constitutionalism merely meant having a written constitution, then virtually every country could claim to be constitutional, as every country that has a written Constitution does. The main question is – ‘does the interim constitution check anybody?’ ‘does it restrain exercise of power, protect our freedoms and safeguard our national interests?’ Constitutional institutions work when there are separation of powers, checks and balance, rule of law, judicial review, periodic elections, ombudsman and effective and independent constitutional bodies. The interim constitution is devoid of these institutions. It does not seek to prevent the government from abusing the power of the state. Everybody knows that it is not the legislature which decides; it only rubber-stamps what has been brought to it from outside.
What type of federal system you recommend for Nepal?
I don’t think there is any perfect model. Perfection is a goal. Even the countries like Canada and the United States, which have built on federalism as forerunners in this area have outstanding problems to be resolved. What India has achieved by now has also been achieved with continued dedication and commitment. It takes years to develop a workable system. You need sincerity and genuine commitment.
Do the 7-party government, the Maoists and other political constituencies have that sincerity and commitment …?
Is it not clear to you that the idea of federalism has come in Nepal not as a development tool, but as a strategic prescription from outside?
Ours has been a small unitary state since long. It has already developed enough historical, political, geographical, and emotional ties among our people. There are geographical, environmental and infrastructural realities behind the unitary character of the state. Our natural and cultural eco-system is so closely connected. Equally strong is the aspiration of our people to continue living as an independent and indivisible country, and with distinct national identity. This is not to deny the problems that we need to address. They are there. But it is not necessary to build on wrong arguments to establish a right case.
What is the right case then?
We need to continue with the unitary character of the state. The demand of the time is to identify the problems the unitary state has created in all subtleties, and then discuss whether federalism is what is necessary to deal with the situation; or there are other efficient ways to handle them. One must understand that federalism cannot be a remedy for all ills of our society. Especially, it is a hapless tool when the politicians are vile and have little national interest to protect.
What makes federalism different from the ‘devolution of power’ in your opinion?
There is nothing in words like ‘federalism’ and ‘devolution.’ The real issue is what do you want? What is your purpose? Do you want to take the country back to the 17th century Malla and Khas principalities in order to deal with issues that are smaller than the size of the remedy being prescribed? Or your purpose is only to bring those people and areas in the mainstream, which are still left behind in the process of our political development.
How do you see the British experience with devolution of powers? Can we learn something from them?
Well, we can always learn from those who have more experience and skills. The United Kingdom has historically been a unitary state with efforts to devolve power to its different territories according to the necessity. The powers of the central government have been devolved to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and Elected Mayors according to their specific requirements. But there is a strong unitary character even now.
Can you elaborate further?
What I mean is devolution was not a part of a grand constitutional design in the UK; rather the approach in each case needs to be understood in relation to their situations. In fact, the devolution legislation has produced an asymmetrical distribution of powers in the country. For example, the extent of powers given to the Scottish Parliament and the Assemblies to Wales and Northern Ireland are different. The Northern Ireland Assembly has also lawmaking powers, but over more restricted policy areas. The form of London-wide government is different that both these types. By way of contrast, Wales has been closely integrated with England for the purpose of law and administration. They were very clear about their problems; and the solutions they fashioned were also case sensitive. Each devolution statute includes elaborate safeguards to prevent sovereignty from being undermined.
How is the relationship between the centre and the units coordinated in this scheme of devolution?
As far as I know, the coordination of administration between central and devolved government has been managed to a large extent without resort to legislation but by means of a series of informal agreements. But the system has been underpinned by a secure financial base. Each of these territories has been able to count upon a consistent overall level of funding. That has helped devolution significantly.
What is the alternative for Nepal then?
Knowing federalism as a concept is one thing; but devising it as a model that can satisfy all constituencies and can also work in practice is quite another. Therefore, it is good to build on our own experience as a unitary state. It has always been a functioning system. There are some lessons learnt; and efforts could be made to reform it. Some interventions at the constitutional level to respond to some of our problems could be necessary. But most of the problems of devolution of power could be handled through an enhanced local self-government system. It can not only restrain exercise of power and protect our freedoms, but also make the transition manageable and safeguard our national interests. There is wisdom in the proverb – “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”
SPOTLIGHT, VOL. 27, NO. 27, March 14, 2008 (Chaitra 01 2064 B.S.)
A consulting lawyer and constitutional analyst, Bipin Adhikari is a keen observer of the ongoing transitional process in Nepal. The Commentatory on the Nepalese Constitution that he co-authored with other constitutional lawyers in 1998 remains an outstanding piece of work on the 1990 Constitution and Nepal’s experiment with constitutionalism. A doctor of constitutional law, Adhikari spoke to SPOTLIGHT about the issue of federalism that Nepal has been confronting in recent months. Excerpts:
How do you see the rule of law situation in the country?
It is undoubtedly pathetic. There is lawlessness, wariness and lack of due process everywhere. The concept of legality seems to have become a fairy tale.
Why is the situation like this?
There are many reasons. But this situation mainly owes to the system of unlimited government that has been installed in the country. It is bringing changes through means that are not legal or legitimate.
Some lawyers argue that there is already an interim Constitution and a representative legislature, although not elected, to check the government?
If constitutionalism merely meant having a written constitution, then virtually every country could claim to be constitutional, as every country that has a written Constitution does. The main question is – ‘does the interim constitution check anybody?’ ‘does it restrain exercise of power, protect our freedoms and safeguard our national interests?’ Constitutional institutions work when there are separation of powers, checks and balance, rule of law, judicial review, periodic elections, ombudsman and effective and independent constitutional bodies. The interim constitution is devoid of these institutions. It does not seek to prevent the government from abusing the power of the state. Everybody knows that it is not the legislature which decides; it only rubber-stamps what has been brought to it from outside.
What type of federal system you recommend for Nepal?
I don’t think there is any perfect model. Perfection is a goal. Even the countries like Canada and the United States, which have built on federalism as forerunners in this area have outstanding problems to be resolved. What India has achieved by now has also been achieved with continued dedication and commitment. It takes years to develop a workable system. You need sincerity and genuine commitment.
Do the 7-party government, the Maoists and other political constituencies have that sincerity and commitment …?
Is it not clear to you that the idea of federalism has come in Nepal not as a development tool, but as a strategic prescription from outside?
Ours has been a small unitary state since long. It has already developed enough historical, political, geographical, and emotional ties among our people. There are geographical, environmental and infrastructural realities behind the unitary character of the state. Our natural and cultural eco-system is so closely connected. Equally strong is the aspiration of our people to continue living as an independent and indivisible country, and with distinct national identity. This is not to deny the problems that we need to address. They are there. But it is not necessary to build on wrong arguments to establish a right case.
What is the right case then?
We need to continue with the unitary character of the state. The demand of the time is to identify the problems the unitary state has created in all subtleties, and then discuss whether federalism is what is necessary to deal with the situation; or there are other efficient ways to handle them. One must understand that federalism cannot be a remedy for all ills of our society. Especially, it is a hapless tool when the politicians are vile and have little national interest to protect.
What makes federalism different from the ‘devolution of power’ in your opinion?
There is nothing in words like ‘federalism’ and ‘devolution.’ The real issue is what do you want? What is your purpose? Do you want to take the country back to the 17th century Malla and Khas principalities in order to deal with issues that are smaller than the size of the remedy being prescribed? Or your purpose is only to bring those people and areas in the mainstream, which are still left behind in the process of our political development.
How do you see the British experience with devolution of powers? Can we learn something from them?
Well, we can always learn from those who have more experience and skills. The United Kingdom has historically been a unitary state with efforts to devolve power to its different territories according to the necessity. The powers of the central government have been devolved to Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, London and Elected Mayors according to their specific requirements. But there is a strong unitary character even now.
Can you elaborate further?
What I mean is devolution was not a part of a grand constitutional design in the UK; rather the approach in each case needs to be understood in relation to their situations. In fact, the devolution legislation has produced an asymmetrical distribution of powers in the country. For example, the extent of powers given to the Scottish Parliament and the Assemblies to Wales and Northern Ireland are different. The Northern Ireland Assembly has also lawmaking powers, but over more restricted policy areas. The form of London-wide government is different that both these types. By way of contrast, Wales has been closely integrated with England for the purpose of law and administration. They were very clear about their problems; and the solutions they fashioned were also case sensitive. Each devolution statute includes elaborate safeguards to prevent sovereignty from being undermined.
How is the relationship between the centre and the units coordinated in this scheme of devolution?
As far as I know, the coordination of administration between central and devolved government has been managed to a large extent without resort to legislation but by means of a series of informal agreements. But the system has been underpinned by a secure financial base. Each of these territories has been able to count upon a consistent overall level of funding. That has helped devolution significantly.
What is the alternative for Nepal then?
Knowing federalism as a concept is one thing; but devising it as a model that can satisfy all constituencies and can also work in practice is quite another. Therefore, it is good to build on our own experience as a unitary state. It has always been a functioning system. There are some lessons learnt; and efforts could be made to reform it. Some interventions at the constitutional level to respond to some of our problems could be necessary. But most of the problems of devolution of power could be handled through an enhanced local self-government system. It can not only restrain exercise of power and protect our freedoms, but also make the transition manageable and safeguard our national interests. There is wisdom in the proverb – “a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush.”
Unlocking some constitutional issues
By DR BIPIN ADHIKARI
The Kathmandu Post April 24, 2008 http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=144860
With the election to the Constituent Assembly accomplished, the focus of political debate in Nepal has at once shifted from the electoral issues to the issues involving formation of a new government according to the fresh mandate. But in the absence of a clear direction under the Constitution, which suffers from many lacunas and caveats, a very constitutional process is about to be handled in an incredibly controversial way.
According to the Interim Constitution, the Constituent Assembly is intended to serve two purposes: first, it has to draft and adopt a new constitution based on popular mandate of the voting adults in the country.
Secondly, it has to bring into being an accountable government to run the country until fresh election under the new Constitution produces a new executive. So, the existing legislature and the executive arm of the government are not to co-exist with the Constituent Assembly designed by the Interim Constitution. As a consequence, the responsibility of the Constituent Assembly is not only regarding the exercise of the constituent power of the people, but also about creating provisions to run the country for the remaining part of the interim period.
This is not always a chosen practise. As an example, in Bolivia which is about to complete the constitution making process, the election to the Constituent Assembly and the timetable for it was announced by Evo Morales, an indigenous leader, who took over as president in January 2006 under the existing Constitution. While both the government and a regular legislature took the normal business of the state, the Constituent Assembly concentrated in the constitution making without being subjected to any real or intangible restraints from any quarter. Its recommendations would need to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and then be submitted to a national referendum for its final approval. At least in principle, this arrangement is aimed at making sure that the rule of law prevails, and there is little excuse for any eventuality.
The model of constituent assembly that has been enshrined into the Interim Constitution of Nepal is different. First, it has created a Constituent Assembly which comes with certain prescriptions like federal structure of the state, the abolition of monarchy, and so on, that pre-empts the power of the Constituent Assembly in a very unacceptable way. Secondly, the unicameral house is supposed to be a legislature, as well as the organ creating the interim governing body.
Thirdly, and partly related with the second feature, is the faulty jurisprudence of ‘consensual’ government’ that has been institutionalised by the Interim Constitution to eliminate opposition at a time when the country needs it more than ever before. Consensus is important in constitution making, but a loyal opposition to the executive power is a crucial requirement, when the country is bringing far-reaching changes in the country.
Article 38(1) of the Interim Constitution ordains that the prime minister is to be appointed on the basis of political consensus. There is no provision in it as to who should initiate the process; how it should be done; and whether there are constitutional rules to be complied with. There is simply nobody who has the authority to judge the competing claims of different parties to lead a new government. Political consensus in the formation of government is the rule even if there is a visibly majority party in the House; or there is a possibility of a strong coalition government. The status of a largest party is not recognized by the Constitution. It goes without saying that in terms of the Constitution, the recent eagerness of the CPN (Maoist) to lead or form a new government has no constitutional basis. This novelty in the constitutional thought is hardly understandable.
Additionally, if consensus cannot be reached as above, the prime minister is to be elected by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Again, although the Council of Ministers is to be formed under the prime minister’s chairmanship, the Council itself is to be the product of political consensus. This means that even if a consensual prime minister is found, his authority to create a cabinet of his choice is not recognized.
In this jurisprudence of consensus, the difference between those who have more popular support, and those who have barely survived, is not constitutionally accepted. So, essentially, a majority prime minister has no majoritarian power, even if that means a clear disregard to the voters, and the fresh mandate they have conferred on the prime minister. This stringent standard penalises a party or a coalition group which commands a majority in the House for its proved electoral strength (instead of recognizing its worth).
This precarious provision of the Interim Constitution comes with another off the wall formulation. For the purpose of this constitution, ‘political consensus’ means the political consensus reached between the seven political parties — Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, United Left Front, and CPN (Maoist). Technically, the Constitution does not require the vote of those parties which did not join the 8 November 2006 consensus, or those who have entered the Constituent Assembly either as a new party, or as an independent candidate.
Oddly enough, the Interim Constitution no where states that the incumbent prime minister must give way to the prime minister elected by the Constituent Assembly. In fact, the Constituent Assembly cannot sit by itself if the prime minister does not call it. He must call it first and then resign voluntarily giving way to the new prime minister. In other words, if Prime Minister GP Koirala decides not to resign at his sweet will, there is no other constitutional way out to force him out except through a no-confidence motion. But for that to happen he must be benevolent to call the house. Even if the House is called, the no-confidence motion requires a two-thirds back up, which does not seem to be possible at this stage.
As this Constitution lays down, the Constituent Assembly at its first meeting (as summoned by the prime minister within 21 days after the final results of the election of members have been made public by the Election Commission) is supposed to implement Nepal’s transition to republic. Here too, such a first meeting cannot rightfully move such a resolution without getting the 26 unelected members of the Assembly on board under Article 63(3).
For this to happen, a government with a fresh mandate must be formed first, and it must be allowed sufficient time to find qualified nominees for the purpose of appointment, unless the parties use the power of the outgoing prime minister to give effect to this provision.
Additionally, the formation of the government itself will be questionable without the voting rights of these 26 members first recognized. Even if the ‘consensus’ formula works to find out a way out, irrespective of the legal validity of the move, the Constitution does not allow the space for the appointment of a president to replace the king as the head of the state. It is possible only after the fourth amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution is clear in the prescription that the prime minister will act as the head of the state until the monarchy is not voted out; but it is not clear as to who will fill up the vacuum once they are successful to do it.
Moreover, a unicameral house of 601 people is a very shrill arrangement. An intelligent strategist, who believes in consensual process of decision making, would never create such loud-mouthed machinery. It is impracticable also because the interim Constitution has not provided any mini-legislature within the Constituent Assembly to work on legislative and policy issues so that these jobs are done professionally within such a unit keeping the time of the house free for constitution-making business. It is too much for all 601 assembly men to work in the Constituent Assembly as both the framers of the constitution and as legislators, and in a meaningful way.
Things do not become legal simply because there is consensus. Unfortunately, at that level of simplicity, it just does not work. It is giving the impression that even after housing 601 assemblymen, freshly elected and nominated, the culture of ad hocism is not likely to disappear in Nepal. Once again the possibility of compromising the higher principles of law and constitutionalism in forming the new government has become imminent.
[lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com]Posted on: 2008-04-23 19:34:24 (Server Time)
The Kathmandu Post April 24, 2008 http://www.kantipuronline.com/kolnews.php?&nid=144860
With the election to the Constituent Assembly accomplished, the focus of political debate in Nepal has at once shifted from the electoral issues to the issues involving formation of a new government according to the fresh mandate. But in the absence of a clear direction under the Constitution, which suffers from many lacunas and caveats, a very constitutional process is about to be handled in an incredibly controversial way.
According to the Interim Constitution, the Constituent Assembly is intended to serve two purposes: first, it has to draft and adopt a new constitution based on popular mandate of the voting adults in the country.
Secondly, it has to bring into being an accountable government to run the country until fresh election under the new Constitution produces a new executive. So, the existing legislature and the executive arm of the government are not to co-exist with the Constituent Assembly designed by the Interim Constitution. As a consequence, the responsibility of the Constituent Assembly is not only regarding the exercise of the constituent power of the people, but also about creating provisions to run the country for the remaining part of the interim period.
This is not always a chosen practise. As an example, in Bolivia which is about to complete the constitution making process, the election to the Constituent Assembly and the timetable for it was announced by Evo Morales, an indigenous leader, who took over as president in January 2006 under the existing Constitution. While both the government and a regular legislature took the normal business of the state, the Constituent Assembly concentrated in the constitution making without being subjected to any real or intangible restraints from any quarter. Its recommendations would need to be approved by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly and then be submitted to a national referendum for its final approval. At least in principle, this arrangement is aimed at making sure that the rule of law prevails, and there is little excuse for any eventuality.
The model of constituent assembly that has been enshrined into the Interim Constitution of Nepal is different. First, it has created a Constituent Assembly which comes with certain prescriptions like federal structure of the state, the abolition of monarchy, and so on, that pre-empts the power of the Constituent Assembly in a very unacceptable way. Secondly, the unicameral house is supposed to be a legislature, as well as the organ creating the interim governing body.
Thirdly, and partly related with the second feature, is the faulty jurisprudence of ‘consensual’ government’ that has been institutionalised by the Interim Constitution to eliminate opposition at a time when the country needs it more than ever before. Consensus is important in constitution making, but a loyal opposition to the executive power is a crucial requirement, when the country is bringing far-reaching changes in the country.
Article 38(1) of the Interim Constitution ordains that the prime minister is to be appointed on the basis of political consensus. There is no provision in it as to who should initiate the process; how it should be done; and whether there are constitutional rules to be complied with. There is simply nobody who has the authority to judge the competing claims of different parties to lead a new government. Political consensus in the formation of government is the rule even if there is a visibly majority party in the House; or there is a possibility of a strong coalition government. The status of a largest party is not recognized by the Constitution. It goes without saying that in terms of the Constitution, the recent eagerness of the CPN (Maoist) to lead or form a new government has no constitutional basis. This novelty in the constitutional thought is hardly understandable.
Additionally, if consensus cannot be reached as above, the prime minister is to be elected by a majority of two-thirds of the members of the Constituent Assembly. Again, although the Council of Ministers is to be formed under the prime minister’s chairmanship, the Council itself is to be the product of political consensus. This means that even if a consensual prime minister is found, his authority to create a cabinet of his choice is not recognized.
In this jurisprudence of consensus, the difference between those who have more popular support, and those who have barely survived, is not constitutionally accepted. So, essentially, a majority prime minister has no majoritarian power, even if that means a clear disregard to the voters, and the fresh mandate they have conferred on the prime minister. This stringent standard penalises a party or a coalition group which commands a majority in the House for its proved electoral strength (instead of recognizing its worth).
This precarious provision of the Interim Constitution comes with another off the wall formulation. For the purpose of this constitution, ‘political consensus’ means the political consensus reached between the seven political parties — Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), Janamorcha Nepal, Nepal Sadbhawana Party (Anandidevi), Nepal Workers and Peasants Party, United Left Front, and CPN (Maoist). Technically, the Constitution does not require the vote of those parties which did not join the 8 November 2006 consensus, or those who have entered the Constituent Assembly either as a new party, or as an independent candidate.
Oddly enough, the Interim Constitution no where states that the incumbent prime minister must give way to the prime minister elected by the Constituent Assembly. In fact, the Constituent Assembly cannot sit by itself if the prime minister does not call it. He must call it first and then resign voluntarily giving way to the new prime minister. In other words, if Prime Minister GP Koirala decides not to resign at his sweet will, there is no other constitutional way out to force him out except through a no-confidence motion. But for that to happen he must be benevolent to call the house. Even if the House is called, the no-confidence motion requires a two-thirds back up, which does not seem to be possible at this stage.
As this Constitution lays down, the Constituent Assembly at its first meeting (as summoned by the prime minister within 21 days after the final results of the election of members have been made public by the Election Commission) is supposed to implement Nepal’s transition to republic. Here too, such a first meeting cannot rightfully move such a resolution without getting the 26 unelected members of the Assembly on board under Article 63(3).
For this to happen, a government with a fresh mandate must be formed first, and it must be allowed sufficient time to find qualified nominees for the purpose of appointment, unless the parties use the power of the outgoing prime minister to give effect to this provision.
Additionally, the formation of the government itself will be questionable without the voting rights of these 26 members first recognized. Even if the ‘consensus’ formula works to find out a way out, irrespective of the legal validity of the move, the Constitution does not allow the space for the appointment of a president to replace the king as the head of the state. It is possible only after the fourth amendment of the Constitution. The Constitution is clear in the prescription that the prime minister will act as the head of the state until the monarchy is not voted out; but it is not clear as to who will fill up the vacuum once they are successful to do it.
Moreover, a unicameral house of 601 people is a very shrill arrangement. An intelligent strategist, who believes in consensual process of decision making, would never create such loud-mouthed machinery. It is impracticable also because the interim Constitution has not provided any mini-legislature within the Constituent Assembly to work on legislative and policy issues so that these jobs are done professionally within such a unit keeping the time of the house free for constitution-making business. It is too much for all 601 assembly men to work in the Constituent Assembly as both the framers of the constitution and as legislators, and in a meaningful way.
Things do not become legal simply because there is consensus. Unfortunately, at that level of simplicity, it just does not work. It is giving the impression that even after housing 601 assemblymen, freshly elected and nominated, the culture of ad hocism is not likely to disappear in Nepal. Once again the possibility of compromising the higher principles of law and constitutionalism in forming the new government has become imminent.
[lawyers_inc_nepal@yahoo.com]Posted on: 2008-04-23 19:34:24 (Server Time)
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